All landowners shall clean out all streams upon and adjacent to their lands at least twice in each year, at such particular times as the respective governing bodies of the several counties of the State may appoint and according to the directions of such governing bodies, and shall keep them clear of all obstruction to a free and uninterrupted flow of sand and water through the channels thereof. This section shall not be construed to prevent the erection and maintenance of any dam across any of such streams for any useful purpose but such governing bodies may require the owner of any such dam to build and maintain therein suitable and sufficient floodgates and waterways to afford free passage through them of the sand and water, so that the streams above may be properly cleaned out and the lands adjacent thereto properly drained and for such purpose they may require the owner of any such dam to open the floodgates or waterways therein and keep them open for such reasonable time as they may deem to be necessary. Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days if ten days' notice to abate such nuisance shall have been given.

HISTORY: 1962 Code Section 70-3; 1952 Code Section 70-3; 1942 Code Section 1215; 1932 Code Section 1215; Cr. C. '22 Section 103; Cr. C. '12 Section 237; Cr. C. '02 Section 183; 1900 (23) 399.

Editor's Note

Early litigation pertaining to this section and similar sections in prior codes developed around the question of constitutionality. In several early cases the effect of the Constitution of 1895 on the subject was considered. In one case it was decided that the legislation was special, but that, as the constitutional restriction was not retroactive, it did not apply. State v Tucker, 54 SC 251, 32 SE 361 (1899). This decision controlled until the sections were incorporated in the Code of 1902, whereupon it was held that this in effect constituted the passage of a new act, and, as the Code excepted certain other counties, it was within the constitutional provision (formerly held not applicable because retroactive), was special legislation, and was null and void. State v Hammond, 66 SC 300, 44 SE 933 (1903). Finally, in Pierce v Marion County Lumber Co., 108 SC 387, 94 SE 865 (1918), it was held constitutional, because under the act and amendment, which was added thereto on February 18, 1905 (24 Stats 830), the General Assembly could pass local and special laws concerning drainage, and this was a matter of drainage. This act was reenacted in Code of 1912, after the creation of Dillon County, and Dillon County was not excepted. State v Tucker, 54 SC 251, 32 SE 361 (1899). State v Hammond, 66 SC 300, 44 SE 933 (1903). Pierce v Marion County Lumber Co., 108 SC 387, 94 SE 865 (1918).

2010 Act No. 247, Section 4.B, provides:

"Chapter 1, Title 49 of the 1976 Code is not affected by and supersedes Chapter 4, Title 49 of the 1976 Code, as amended by SECTION 1 of this act."