A. All commercial motor carrier vehicles shall enter, leave or travel through the state on designated highways and shall stop at every port of entry as designated by the division for manifesting and clearance stickers, except as provided in Subsection H of this section.

B. An officer may enforce in the field the provisions of the Motor Transportation Act and the Motor Carrier Act [65-2A-1 to 65-2A-41 NMSA 1978] and perform inspections as provided in this section whenever the officer stops a commercial motor carrier vehicle after observing that the vehicle is in, or is being operated in, violation of those acts, the Motor Vehicle Code [Chapter 66, Articles 1 to 8 NMSA 1978] or the Criminal Code [Chapter 30 NMSA 1978].

C. The operator of a commercial motor carrier vehicle shall:

(1) upon request, make out and deliver to the agent of the division at a port of entry or to an officer conducting field enforcement a manifest showing that part of the following information requested:

(a) the point of origin of the shipment;

(b) the ultimate destination of the shipment; and

(c) the gross vehicle weight of the vehicle and cargo;

(2) sign the manifest and present it to the agent at the port of entry or to the officer conducting field enforcement; and

(3) present for inspection to the agent at the port of entry or the officer conducting field enforcement a copy of the billing or invoice describing the contents of the cargo and the weight of the cargo.

D. The agent at the port of entry or the officer conducting field enforcement may verify the information contained upon the billing or invoice and shall:

(1) check the license, permit, engine and serial numbers, weight and description of the vehicle; and

(2) inspect the vehicle and ascertain whether it is in safe and road-worthy condition and properly equipped with all lights, brakes and other appliances required by law.

E. The agent at the port of entry or officer conducting field enforcement may confirm the contents and weight of the cargo of a commercial motor carrier vehicle and interview the operator about the cargo and, if in doubt as to the declared gross weight, may order the cargo weighed before issuing any clearance certificate for the vehicle.

F. The agent at the port of entry or the officer conducting field enforcement may inspect the contents of a commercial motor carrier vehicle to determine whether all taxes on gasoline and motor fuel and excise taxes on alcoholic liquors and all taxes on any other property have been fully paid.

G. The agent at the port of entry or the officer conducting field enforcement may inspect a commercial motor carrier vehicle and its contents to determine whether they are in compliance with laws and rules regarding public safety, health, welfare and comfort.

H. An agricultural product transport vehicle is excluded from the requirements of Subsection A of this section if the agricultural product transport vehicle has cleared the port of entry at least once and has successfully passed a commercial vehicle safety alliance level 1 inspection during the current harvest season.

I. As used in this section, "agricultural product transport vehicle" means a motor vehicle, freight trailer or utility trailer or a combination thereof used exclusively for hauling agricultural products harvested by a farmer from the place of harvesting to market, storage or a processing plant.

History: 1941 Comp., § 68-1527, enacted by Laws 1943, ch. 125, § 8; 1953 Comp., § 64-30-8; Laws 1967, ch. 97, § 37; 1977, ch. 250, § 96; 1983, ch. 142, § 1; 2008, ch. 63, § 1; 2011, ch. 101, § 2.

Cross references. — For definition of division, see 65-1-2 NMSA 1978.

For ports of entry designated by motor transportation division, see 65-1-11 NMSA 1978.

The 2011 amendment, effective June 17, 2011, authorized officers in the field to enforce the Motor Transportation Act and the Motor Carrier Act and to inspect commercial motor carrier vehicles and eliminated from the list of information that an operator is required to provide in a manifest the names of the owner, operator and forwarding company, the license number and state in which the vehicle is permitted, the engine number, the serial number of the vehicle, the factory list capacity of the vehicle, the number of taxable miles traveled in New Mexico, and the public liability insurance coverage of the vehicle and cargo.

The 2008 amendment, effective May 14, 2008, added Subsections G and H.

Constitutionality. — New Mexico's regulatory scheme is a sufficient substitute for a warrant as determined by the three-part test articulated in N.Y. v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). U.S. v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740 (10th Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Gwathney, 465 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2006).

The regulatory scheme governing commercial carriers provides adequate notice to owners and operators of commercial carriers that their property will be subject to periodic inspections and adequately limits the discretion of inspectors in place and scope. U.S. v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).

Limitation on stopping of vehicles. — In the absence of reasonable suspicion, stops must be carried out pursuant to a plan which embodies explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. State v. Clark, 1991-NMCA-082, 112 N.M. 500, 816 P.2d 1122.

Legal stop ripening into illegal arrest. — Although initial stop of commercial truck was legal under New Mexico's inspection statutes, the stop ripened into an unlawful de facto arrest when, without probable cause, officer required the driver to wait an hour; the illegality of the arrest vitiated driver's subsequent consent to the search of his truck, and rendered the stolen motorcycles which were found inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. State v. Jutte, 1998-NMCA-150, 126 N.M. 244, 968 P.2d 334, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 533, 972 P.2d 352.

Invalid stopping of vehicles. — Motor transportation division officer's stop of a rental truck was not made at a port of entry and was invalid, where the officer had not set out any signs or other indication to vehicle drivers that they would be required to stop, had stopped vehicles randomly and at his own discretion, and had chosen his own schedule of where to patrol, as opposed to his supervisor making the decision. State v. Clark, 1991-NMCA-082, 112 N.M. 500, 816 P.2d 1122.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commerce §§ 26 to 34.

15 C.J.S. Commerce § 71(3).