A. Claims for benefits shall be made in accordance with such regulations as the secretary may prescribe. Each employer shall post and maintain printed notices, in places readily accessible to employees, concerning their rights to file claims for unemployment benefits upon termination of their employment. Such notices shall be supplied by the division to each employer without cost to the employer.

B. A representative designated by the secretary as a claims examiner shall promptly examine the application and each weekly claim and, on the basis of the facts found, shall determine whether the claimant is unemployed, the week with respect to which benefits shall commence, the weekly benefit amount payable, the maximum duration of benefits, whether the claimant is eligible for benefits pursuant to Section 51-1-5 NMSA 1978 and whether the claimant shall be disqualified pursuant to Section 51-1-7 NMSA 1978. With the approval of the secretary, the claims examiner may refer, without determination, claims or any specified issues involved therein that raise complex questions of fact or law to a hearing officer for the division for a fair hearing and decision in accordance with the procedure described in Subsection D of this section. The claims examiner shall promptly notify the claimant and any other interested party of the determination and the reasons therefor. Unless the claimant or interested party, within fifteen calendar days after the date of notification or mailing of the determination, files an appeal from the determination, the determination shall be the final decision of the division; provided that the claims examiner may reconsider a nonmonetary determination if additional information not previously available is provided or obtained or whenever the claims examiner finds an error in the application of law has occurred, but no redetermination shall be made more than twenty days from the date of the initial nonmonetary determination. Notice of a nonmonetary redetermination shall be given to all interested parties and shall be subject to appeal in the same manner as the original nonmonetary determination. If an appeal is pending at the time a redetermination is issued, the appeal, unless withdrawn, shall be treated as an appeal from the redetermination.

C. In the case of a claim for waiting period credit or benefits, "interested party", for purposes of determinations and adjudication proceedings and notices thereof, means:

(1) in the event of an issue concerning a separation from work for reasons other than lack of work, the claimant's most recent employer or most recent employing unit;

(2) in the event of an issue concerning a separation from work for lack of work, the employer or employing unit from whom the claimant separated for reasons other than lack of work if the claimant has not worked and earned wages in insured work or bona fide employment other than self-employment in an amount equal to or exceeding five times the claimant's weekly benefit amount; or

(3) in all other cases involving the allowance or disallowance of a claim, the secretary, the claimant and any employing unit directly involved in the facts at issue.

D. Upon appeal by any party, a hearing officer designated by the secretary shall afford the parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing to be held de novo, and the hearing officer shall issue findings of fact and a decision that affirms, reverses or modifies the determination of the claims examiner or tax representative on the facts or the law, based upon the evidence introduced at such hearing, including the documents and statements in the claim or tax records of the division. All hearings shall be held in accordance with regulations of the secretary and decisions issued promptly in accordance with time lapse standards promulgated by the secretary of the United States department of labor. The parties shall be duly notified of the decision, together with the reasons therefor, which shall be deemed to be the final decision of the department, unless within fifteen days after the date of notification or mailing of the decision further appeal is initiated pursuant to Subsection H of this section.

E. Except with the consent of the parties, no hearing officer or members of the board of review, established in Subsection F of this section, or secretary shall sit in any administrative or adjudicatory proceeding in which:

(1) either of the parties is related to the hearing officer, member of the board of review or secretary by affinity or consanguinity within the degree of first cousin;

(2) the hearing officer, member of the board of review or secretary was counsel for either party in that action; or

(3) the hearing officer, member of the board of review or secretary has an interest that would prejudice the rendering of an impartial decision.

The secretary, any member of the board of review or appeal tribunal hearing officer shall withdraw from any proceeding in which the hearing officer, member of the board of review or secretary cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or when a reasonable person would seriously doubt whether the hearing officer, board member or secretary could be fair and impartial. Any party may request a disqualification of any appeal tribunal hearing officer or board of review member by filing an affidavit with the board of review or appeal tribunal promptly upon discovery of the alleged grounds for disqualification, stating with particularity the grounds upon which it is claimed that the person cannot be fair and impartial. The disqualification shall be mandatory if sufficient factual basis is set forth in the affidavit of disqualification. If a member of the board of review is disqualified or withdraws from any proceeding, the remaining members of the board of review may appoint an appeal tribunal hearing officer to sit on the board of review for the proceeding involved.

F. There is established within the department, for the purpose of providing higher level administrative appeal and review of determinations of a claims examiner or decisions issued by a hearing officer pursuant to Subsection B or D of this section, a "board of review" consisting of three members. Two members shall be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. The members so appointed shall hold office at the pleasure of the governor for terms of four years. One member appointed by the governor shall be a person who, on account of previous vocation, employment or affiliation, can be classed as a representative of employers, and the other member appointed by the governor shall be a person who, on account of previous vocation, employment or affiliation, can be classed as a representative of employees. The third member shall be an employee of the department appointed by the secretary who shall serve as chair of the board. Either member of the board of review appointed by the governor who has missed two consecutive meetings of the board may be removed from the board by the governor. Actions of the board shall be taken by majority vote. If a vacancy on the board in a position appointed by the governor occurs between sessions of the legislature, the position shall be filled by the governor until the next regular legislative session. The board shall meet at the call of the secretary. Members of the board appointed by the governor shall be paid per diem and mileage in accordance with the Per Diem and Mileage Act [10-8-1 to 10-8-8 NMSA 1978] for necessary travel to attend regularly scheduled meetings of the board of review for the purpose of conducting the board's appellate and review duties.

G. The board of review shall hear and review all cases appealed in accordance with Subsection H of this section. The board of review may affirm, reverse or modify the decision of the hearing officer or remand any matter to the claims examiner, tax representative or hearing officer for further proceedings. Each member appointed by the governor shall be compensated at the rate of fifteen dollars ($15.00) for each case reviewed up to a maximum compensation of twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) in any one fiscal year.

H. Any party aggrieved by a final decision of a hearing officer may file, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the secretary, an application for appeal and review of the decision with the secretary. The secretary shall review the application and shall, within fifteen days after receipt of the application, either affirm the decision of the hearing officer, reverse the decision of the hearing officer, modify the decision of the hearing officer, remand the matter to the hearing officer, tax representative or claims examiner for an additional hearing or refer the decision to the board of review for further review and decision on the merits of the appeal. If the secretary affirms, reverses or modifies the decision of the hearing officer, that decision shall be the final administrative decision of the department and any appeal therefrom shall be taken to the district court in accordance with the provisions of Subsections M and N of this section. If the secretary remands a matter to a hearing officer, tax representative or claims examiner for an additional hearing, judicial review shall be permitted only after issuance of a final administrative decision. If the secretary refers the decision of the hearing officer to the board of review for further review, the board's decision on the merits of the appeal shall be the final administrative decision of the department, which may be appealed to the district court in accordance with the provisions of Subsections M and N of this section. If the secretary takes no action within fifteen days of receipt of the application for appeal and review, the decision shall be promptly scheduled for review by the board of review as though it had been referred by the secretary. The secretary may request the board of review to review a decision of a hearing officer that the secretary believes to be inconsistent with the law or with applicable rules of interpretation or that is not supported by the evidence, and the board of review shall grant the request if it is filed within fifteen days of the issuance of the decision of the hearing officer. The secretary may also direct that any pending determination or adjudicatory proceeding be removed to the board of review for a final decision. If the board of review holds a hearing on any matter, the hearing shall be conducted by a quorum of the board of review in accordance with regulations prescribed by the secretary for hearing appeals. The board of review shall promptly notify the interested parties of its findings of fact and decision. A decision of the board of review on any disputed matter reviewed and decided by it shall be based upon the law and the lawful rules of interpretation issued by the secretary, and it shall be the final administrative decision of the department, except in cases of remand. If the board of review remands a matter to a hearing officer, claims examiner or tax representative, judicial review shall be permitted only after issuance of a final administrative decision.

I. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section granting any party the right to appeal, benefits shall be paid promptly in accordance with a determination or a decision of a claims examiner, hearing officer, secretary, board of review or reviewing court, regardless of the pendency of the period to file an appeal or petition for judicial review that is provided with respect thereto in Subsection D or M of this section or the pendency of any such filing or petition until such determination or decision has been modified or reversed by a subsequent decision. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all claims for benefits pending on the date of its enactment.

J. If a determination or decision allowing benefits is finally modified or reversed, the appropriate contributing employer will be relieved of benefit charges in accordance with Subsection A of Section 51-1-11 NMSA 1978.

K. The manner in which disputed claims shall be presented, the reports thereon required from the claimant and from employers and the conduct of hearings and appeals shall be in accordance with rules prescribed by the secretary for determining the rights of the parties, whether or not the rules conform to common law or statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure. A hearing officer or the board of review may refer to the secretary for interpretation any question of controlling legal significance, and the secretary shall issue a declaratory interpretation, which shall be binding upon the decision of the hearing officer and the board of review. A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings in connection with a disputed claim. All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed claim shall be recorded but need not be transcribed unless the disputed claim is appealed to the district court.

L. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to this section shall be allowed fees at a rate fixed by the secretary. Such fees and all administrative expenses of proceedings involving disputed claims shall be deemed a part of the expense of administering the Unemployment Compensation Law.

M. Any determination or decision of a claims examiner or hearing officer or by a representative of the tax section of the department in the absence of an appeal therefrom as provided by this section shall become final fifteen days after the date of notification or mailing thereof, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted the remedies as provided in Subsection H of this section. The division and any employer or claimant who is affected by the decision shall be joined as a party in any judicial action involving the decision. All parties shall be served with an endorsed copy of the petition within thirty days from the date of filing and an endorsed copy of the order granting the petition within fifteen days from entry of the order. Service on the department shall be made on the secretary or the secretary's designated legal representative either by mail with accompanying certification of service or by personal service. The division may be represented in a judicial action by an attorney employed by the department or, when requested by the secretary, by the attorney general or any district attorney.

N. The final decision of the secretary or board of review upon any disputed matter may be reviewed both upon the law, including the lawful rules of interpretation issued by the secretary, and the facts by the district court of the county wherein the person seeking the review resides upon certiorari, unless it is determined by the district court where the petition is filed that, as a matter of equity and due process, venue should be in a different county. For the purpose of the review, the division shall return on certiorari the reports and all of the evidence heard by it on the reports and all the papers and documents in its files affecting the matters and things involved in such certiorari. The district court shall render its judgment after hearing, and either the department or any other party affected may appeal from the judgment to the court of appeals in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure. Certiorari shall not be granted unless applied for within thirty days from the date of the final decision of the secretary or board of review. Certiorari shall be heard in a summary manner and shall be given precedence over all other civil cases except cases arising under the Workers' Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978]. It is not necessary in any proceedings before the division to enter exceptions to the rulings, and no bond shall be required in obtaining certiorari from the district court, but certiorari shall be granted as a matter of right to the party applying therefor.

History: Laws 1936 (S.S.), ch. 1, § 6; 1941 Comp., § 57-806; 1953 Comp., § 59-9-6; Laws 1953, ch. 121, § 4; 1972, ch. 5, § 1; 1973, ch. 216, § 1; 1979, ch. 280, § 15; 1981, ch. 354, § 4; 1983, ch. 199, § 4; 1987, ch. 63, § 2; 1990, ch. 18, § 3; 1991, ch. 122, § 5; 1993, ch. 209, § 3; 1994, ch. 89, § 1; 1996, ch. 33, § 1; 1998, ch. 91, § 2; 2004, ch. 93, § 1; 2013, ch. 132, § 1; 2013, ch. 133, § 1.

Cross references. — For procedures governing appeals to the district court, see Rule 1-077 NMRA.

For Rules of Evidence, see Rule 11-101 NMRA et seq.

For scope of review of the district court, see Zamora v. Village of Ruidoso Downs, 120 N.M. 778, 907 P.2d 182 (1995).

2013 Multiple Amendments. — Laws 2013, ch. 132, § 1 and Laws 2013, ch. 133, § 1 enacted different amendments to this section that can be reconciled. Pursuant to 12-1-8 NMSA 1978, Laws 2013, ch. 133, § 1, as the last act signed by the governor, is set out above and incorporates both amendments. The amendments enacted by Laws 2013, ch. 132, § 1 and Laws 2013, ch. 133, § 1 are described below. To view the session laws in their entirety, see the 2013 session laws on NMOneSource.com.

The nature of the difference between the amendments is that Laws 2013, ch. 132, §1 eliminated the right to receive benefits before all appeals have been exhausted and Laws 2013, ch. 133, § 1 relieved employers of benefit charges if a determination allowing benefits is finally modified or reversed.

Laws 2013, ch. 133, §1, effective January 1, 2015, made grammatical changes and relieved employers of benefit charges if a determination allowing benefits is finally modified or reversed; and in Subsection J, in the second sentence, after "appropriate contributing", deleted "employer's account" and added "employer".

Laws 2013, ch. 132, §1, effective July 1, 2013, made grammatical changes and eliminated the right to receive benefits before all appeals have been exhausted; and in Subsection J, deleted the former first sentence, which read "If a prior determination or decision allowing benefits is affirmed by a decision of the department, including the board of review or a reviewing court, the benefits shall be paid promptly regardless of any further appeal which may thereafter be available to the parties, and no injunction, supersedeas, stay or other writ or process suspending the payment of benefits shall be issued by the secretary or board of review or any court, and no action to recover benefits paid to a claimant shall be taken.".

The 2004 amendment, effective May 19, 2004, amended Subsection E to change "him" or "he" to "the hearing officer, member of the board of review or secretary" in three places, amended Subsection H to add after "hearing officer," "reverse the decision of the hearing officer, modify the decision of the hearing officer," and to add after "affirms," "reverses or modifies".

The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, in the undesignated paragraph preceding Subsection F, added "or when a reasonable person would seriously doubt whether the hearing officer, board member or secretary could be fair and impartial" at the end of the first sentence; in Subsection H, inserted "tax representative" near the middle of the second sentence and "tax representative or claims examiner" near the beginning of the fourth sentence; deleted "as hereinabove provided" following "district court" near the end of Subsection N, and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, in Subsection D, inserted "or tax" and substituted "division" for "department" at the end of the first sentence; in Subsection H, inserted "of the claims examiner" in the second sentence, substituted "shall" for "must" in the third sentence, and inserted "of fact" in the tenth sentence; and in Subsection N, substituted "court of appeals" for "supreme court of the state" and "of appellate procedure" for "governing special statutory proceedings" in the third sentence.

The 1994 amendment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "that" for "which" in the second sentence in Subsection B, and substituted "fifteen dollars ($15.00)" for "five dollars ($5.00)" and "twelve thousand dollars ($12,000)" for "five thousand dollars ($5,000)" in Subsection G.

The 1993 amendment, effective April 5, 1993, added the proviso at the end of the fourth sentence and added the last two sentences of Subsection B; substituted "board of review" for "review board" and inserted "established in Subsection F of this section" in the introductory paragraph, and added the final unnumbered paragraph, in Subsection E; inserted "of review" following "board" in four places in Subsection H; substituted "shall be paid" for "must be paid" in the first sentence of Subsection J; and made minor stylistic changes.

The 1991 amendment, effective April 3, 1991, substituted "division" for "department" throughout the section; inserted "application and each weekly" near the beginning of the first sentence in Subsection B; inserted "or tax representative" near the middle of the first sentence in Subsection D; inserted "or secretary" in the introductory paragraph in Subsection E; in Subsection G, inserted the second sentence and substituted "five thousand dollars ($5,000)" for "six thousand dollars ($6,000)" in the third sentence; in Subsection H, inserted "administrative" near the middle of the third sentence, inserted the fourth sentence, inserted "on the merits of the appeal" near the middle of the fifth sentence, added "except in cases of remand" at the end of the next-to-last sentence and added the last sentence; inserted "secretary" near the middle of the first sentence in Subsection I; in Subsection J, inserted "secretary or" near the end of the first sentence and substituted "be relieved of benefit charges in accordance with Subsection B of Section 51-1-11 NMSA 1978" for "not be charged with benefits which the order of modification or reversal ruled should not have been paid" at the end of the second sentence; rewrote the third sentence in Subsection M, which read "All parties shall be served with a copy of the petition and order granting the petition"; and, in Subsection N, deleted "hearing officer as affirmed by the" preceding "secretary" in the first and next-to-last sentences and deleted "of the department" following "rulings" in final sentence.

The 1990 amendment, effective February 28, 1990, in Subsection B, substituted "specified issues" for "specified issue or" in the second sentence and deleted the former fourth sentence which read "The secretary shall, by regulation, determine who shall be an 'interested party' for purposes of determinations and adjudication proceedings and notices thereof"; added present Subsection C; designated the former fifth through seventh sentences of Subsection B as present Subsection D; designated former Subsections D to M as present Subsections E to N; inserted "remanded the matter to the hearing officer for an additional hearing" in the second sentence of present Subsection H; substituted "shall be paid" for "must be paid" near the beginning of the first sentence in present Subsection I; substituted "Workers' Compensation Act" for "Workmen's Compensation Act" in the fifth sentence in present Subsection N; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

Review by the court of appeals. — A party does not have an appeal as of right from the decision of the district court on review of administrative decisions involving unemployment compensation benefits. Rule 12-505 NMRA requires a party to seek discretionary review of the district court decision in the court of appeals by means of a petition for writ of certiorari. Wakeland v. New Mexico Dep't of Workforce Solutions, 2012-NMCA-021, 274 P.3d 766, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-001.

Court without jurisdiction where appeal taken to division. — District court was without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a commission (now division) decision, where appellant merely took his appeal to the commission (division) itself, rather than the district court, within 15 days after notification of the decision. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109 (1967).

Division quasi-judicial in nature. — The express power granted the commission (now division) by the legislature is quasi-judicial in its nature and authorizes it to decide issues submitted under the labor dispute of Section 51-1-7D NMSA 1978 (now Section 51-1-7C NMSA 1978). Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

Applicability of procedural provisions. — Legislature intended that procedural provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law should apply to decisions fixing employer's rate of contribution to the same extent as they do to employee's claim for benefits under the act. M.R. Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1946-NMSC-026, 50 N.M. 309, 176 P.2d 190.

Failure to follow statute and regulations. — Where worker was terminated by employer for fighting; worker filed a claim for unemployment benefits on May 16, 2010; employer did not respond to the department's request for separation information and the department did not conduct an investigation; although the department did not issue a notice of claim determination concerning the separation issue, it informed worker that worker was eligible for benefits and provided benefits commencing May 29, 2010 for thirteen weeks; when worker filed a second claim on June 28, 2011 for unemployment benefits for the next benefit year, the department telephoned worker and employer, and learned that worker had been fired for fighting with another employee; the department disqualified worker from receiving benefits beginning the week ending May 22, 2010 and sent worker an overpayment notice informing worker that worker was liable for repayment for fifty-eight weeks of benefits; and the department's regulations permitted the department to reconsider a claim due to new or additional information within twenty days after the date of the original determination or date of first payment, whichever occurred last, the department was precluded from reconsidering worker's claim because the reason for worker's termination could have been discovered during the initial processing of worker's claim and the department reconsidered worker's claim more than thirteen months after either the original determination of worker's eligibility or the first payment of benefits to worker. Narvaez v. New Mexico Dep't of Workforce Solutions, 2013-NMCA-079, cert. denied, 2013-NMCERT-006.

Procedural steps reduced to minimum in labor dispute. — Legislature intended that in a labor dispute the procedural steps should be reduced to a minimum in order to obtain a prompt ultimate decision. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

Service requirements not jurisdictional. — Strict compliance with the service requirement of Subsection M was not a precondition to jurisdiction of an appeal from a final administrative decision; thus, the district court had jurisdiction when the employee filed his petition for certiorari with the court within 30 days as required by Subsection N, even though service of the petition and the order on the Department of Labor, Employment Security Division and the employer was 16 days late. Jueng v. New Mexico Dep't of Labor, 1996-NMSC-006, 121 N.M. 237, 910 P.2d 313.

Court to make own findings of fact. — In determining the scope of review of the district court, this section and Rule 1-081C(4) NMRA mean that the district court shall make its own findings of fact after a review of the evidence. They do not mean, necessarily, that the district court must ignore the findings of the department (now division). It may give them some weight and should follow the department's (division's) findings in making its own, save where the evidence clearly preponderates against him. In the last analysis, however, the responsibility of making correct findings rests with the district court and it is not to be hampered or embarrassed in the performance of this duty by the findings of the department (division). Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-029, 92 N.M. 694, 594 P.2d 742 (decided under prior law).

Although additional evidence not contemplated. — Although Subsection M (now N) provides that "the district court shall render its judgment after hearing," the taking of additional evidence by the district court is not contemplated by this section. Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-047, 93 N.M. 71, 596 P.2d 514.

Court examines entire record. — To decide if the district court was correct in finding substantial evidence to support the order of the board, the reviewing court must independently examine the entire record. Randolph v. New Mexico Emp't Sec. Dep't, 1989-NMSC-031, 108 N.M. 441, 774 P.2d 435.

Court to give weight to division findings. — District court in reviewing action of employment security commission (now employment security division) in fixing an employer's rate of contribution must give weight to findings made at hearing before the commission (division) and should follow such findings, except where the evidence clearly preponderates against such findings. M.R. Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1946-NMSC-026, 50 N.M. 309, 176 P.2d 190.

In reviewing an award of unemployment benefits, the district court must grant the board of review its proper authority to exclude evidence and substitute its own findings of fact for those of the hearing officer, where appropriate. Mississippi Potash, Inc. v. Lemon, 2003-NMCA-014, 133 N.M. 128, 61 P.3d 837.

Division's findings to be supported by substantial evidence. — This section and Rule 1-081C(4) NMRA, require the district court to review a challenged decision of the employment security commission (now employment security division) to determine whether it is lawful. In so determining, the reviewing court must determine whether the commission's (now division's) findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court shall adopt as its own such of the commission's (division's) findings of fact as it determines to be supported by substantial evidence and shall make such conclusions of law and decision as lawfully follow therefrom. If the district court determines that the legal evidence before the commission (division) fails to substantially support such findings or decision, then the district court shall make its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision based only upon the legal evidence before the commission (division). Wilson v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-085, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855; Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-047, 93 N.M. 71, 596 P.2d 514; Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-029, 92 N.M. 694, 594 P.2d 742 (decided under prior law).

"Substantial evidence" defined. — "Substantial evidence" means more than merely any evidence, more than a scintilla of evidence, and contemplates such relevant legal evidence as a reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion; evidence is substantial if reasonable men all agree, or if they may fairly differ, as to whether it establishes a fact. Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-029, 92 N.M. 694,594 P.2d 742.

No right of reconsideration after board of review decision. — After the commission (now board of review) has rendered its decision it has exercised the express power conferred by the act upon it. No right of reconsideration remains. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

No private right of action for interference with recovery of unemployment compensation. — A terminated employee who alleged that her employer's testimony prevented her from receiving unemployment benefits had no private right of action against the employer for interference with recovery of unemployment compensation. Stock v. Grantham, 1998-NMCA-081, 125 N.M. 564, 964 P.2d 125, cert. denied, 125 N.M. 322, 961 P.2d 167.

Last employer deemed party to district court proceedings. — The last employer of a claimant by virtue of its participation in the adjudicatory hearing before the employment security commission (now employment security division) is a party to proceedings in the district court and that court may properly deny a commission (division) motion to dismiss because of failure to join the last employer. Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1979-NMSC-047, 93 N.M. 71, 596 P.2d 514.

Statement of counsel of poor quality transcript does not support conclusion. — Statement by counsel in employment security commission (now employment security division) proceedings that transcript of hearing before the deputy was not of the quality to be placed in the record due to mechanical difficulties does not justify a conclusion that the record was incomplete or illegible or insufficient for appeal. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 1967-NMSC-182, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109.

Division not to withhold payment where eligibility determined to preliminary hearing. — The employment security commission (now employment security division) may not withhold payment, pending the employer's appeal, of unemployment compensation benefits to those employees who have been found eligible for such benefits at the preliminary determination hearing. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-09.

Law reviews. — For article, "Constitutional Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by Administrative Agencies," see 7 Nat. Res. J. 599 (1967).

For comment on Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 78 N.M. 398, 432 P.2d 109 (1967), see 8 Nat. Res. J. 341 (1968).

For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Administrative Law," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1981).

For article, "Unemployment Compensation in New Mexico," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 327 (1981).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to administrative law, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1982).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to administrative law, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 235 (1983).

For comment, "Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits Out of Worker's Partial Third-Party Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc.," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 437 (1984).

For article, "Substantial Evidence Reconsidered: The Post-Duke City Difficulties and Some Suggestions for Their Resolution," see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 525 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation §§ 4, 5, 202 to 222.

Vested right of applicant for unemployment compensation in mode and manner of computing benefits in effect at time of his discharge or loss of employment, 20 A.L.R.2d 963.

Failure or delay with respect to filing or reporting requirements as ground for denial of unemployment compensation benefits, 97 A.L.R.2d 752.

Comment note on hearsay evidence in proceedings before state administrative agencies, 36 A.L.R.3d 12.

Unemployment compensation: eligibility as affected by claimant's refusal to work at reduced compensation, 95 A.L.R.3d 449.

Part-time or intermittent workers as covered by or as eligible for benefits under state Unemployment Compensation Act, 95 A.L.R.3d 891.

Employee's refusal to take lie detector test as barring unemployment compensation, 18 A.L.R.4th 307.

81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare §§ 147, 157, 216 to 234, 268, 279 to 288.