A. Any person, firm or corporation, including an insurance carrier, making any payment to a patient or to his attorney, heirs or legal representative as compensation for the injury sustained, after the filing and receipt of written notice of the lien, as aforesaid, and without paying the hospital asserting the lien the amount of its lien or that portion of the lien which can be satisfied out of the money due under any final judgment or contract of compromise or settlement, less payment of the amount of any prior liens, shall be liable to the hospital for the amount that the hospital was entitled to receive.

B. Liability of the person, firm or corporation for the satisfaction of the hospital lien shall continue for a period of one year after the date of any payment of any money to the patient, his heirs or legal representatives as damages or under a contract of compromise or settlement. Any hospital may enforce its lien by a suit at law against the person, firm or corporation making the payment. In the event of a suit to enforce a lien the hospital may recover a reasonable attorney's fee and the costs of filing and recording the lien.

History: 1953 Comp., § 61-9-3, enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 227, § 3.

Running of limitation period. — This section makes payment to the patient the act that triggers the running of the one-year limitation period. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 1986-NMSC-006, 103 N.M. 709, 712 P.2d 1371.

The statute of limitations runs from the time the court orders disbursement of insurance policy proceeds, not the date that the proceeds are deposited in the court registry. Schroeder v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 1997-NMSC-046, 123 N.M. 719, 945 P.2d 449.

A public hospital has the authority to reduce the amount of a lien. — Courts may lack the equitable or discretionary power to void or reduce public hospital liens without the hospital's agreement and absent a good faith dispute, but a public hospital has the authority to reduce undisputed obligations with patient-debtors. Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2015-NMSC-024, overruling in part Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 1983-NMSC-016, 99 N.M. 333, 657 P.2d 1182.

In interpleader proceeding, where plaintiff's first attorney agreed to give up his statutory priority over settlement funds, so the university of New Mexico hospital (UNMH) would be paid first, in exchange for the hospital agreeing to accept a lesser amount for plaintiff's outstanding medical bills, the New Mexico supreme court held that the first clause of N.M. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 32 is strictly a limitation on the legislature, and UNMH, as a state hospital, is not constitutionally prohibited from compromising undisputed obligations with patient-debtors. Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2015-NMSC-024, overruling in part Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 1983-NMSC-016, 99 N.M. 333, 657 P.2d 1182.

Court lacks authority to void or reduce liens. — The district court lacks equitable or discretionary power to void or reduce the public hospital liens which are created pursuant to this article. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 1983-NMSC-01699 N.M. 333, 657 P.2d 1182.

"Legal representative". — An attorney is a "legal representative" for purposes of receiving payment under this section and to commence the running of the statute of limitations therein. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Lacey, 1988-NMSC-086, 107 N.M. 742, 764 P.2d 873.

"Payment of any money" for purposes of Subsection B occurred when an insurer delivered a settlement check to a personal injury victim, and not on the date when the check was deposited in a bank. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Lacey, 1988-NMSC-086, 107 N.M. 742, 764 P.2d 873.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 15.