A lien is a charge imposed upon specific property, by which it is made security for the performance of an act.

History: Laws 1880, ch. 16, § 1; C.L. 1884, § 1519; C.L. 1897, § 2216; Code 1915, § 3318; C.S. 1929, § 82-201; 1941 Comp., § 63-201; 1953 Comp., § 61-2-1.

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.

Cross references. — For oil and gas products lien, see 48-9-1 NMSA 1978.

For municipal utilities, liens on property, see 3-23-6 NMSA 1978.

For sewer assessments, liens, see 3-26-2 NMSA 1978.

For improvement district assessments, liens, see 3-33-23 NMSA 1978.

For municipal liens for taxes and assessments, see 3-36-1 NMSA 1978.

For refuse collection assessment as municipal lien on realty, see 3-48-7 NMSA 1978.

For assessment for irrigation of trees and shrubs in municipalities, lien, see 3-53-5 NMSA 1978.

For judgment as lien on real estate, see 39-1-6 NMSA 1978.

For decree for support of children, lien on real estate, see 40-4-15 NMSA 1978.

For adjudication of water rights, costs of hydrographic survey a lien, see 72-4-17 NMSA 1978.

For county board of horticultural commissioners, lien for expenses, see 76-3-3 NMSA 1978.

For rodent pest repression, lien on land, see 77-15-4, 77-15-5 NMSA 1978.

The New Mexico Mechanics' Lien Law is constitutional. Gray v. N.M. Pumice Stone Co., 1910-NMSC-036, 15 N.M. 478, 110 P. 603; Genest v. Las Vegas Masonic Bldg. Ass'n, 1902-NMSC-003, 11 N.M. 251, 67 P. 743; Baldridge v. Morgan, 1910-NMSC-003, 15 N.M. 249, 106 P. 342.

Legislative intent. — The object of the Mechanics' Lien Law is to protect those who, by their labor, services, skill or materials furnished, have enhanced the value of the property sought to be charged. Hobbs v. Spiegelberg, 1885-NMSC-014, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 357, 5 P. 529.

Construction of act. — This act should be construed liberally. Hot Springs Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Wallace, 1933-NMSC-092, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984.

Liberal construction. — The right to a lien is purely statutory, and a claimant to such a lien must in the first instance bring himself clearly within the terms of the statute. The statute is strictly construed as to persons entitled to its benefits and as to the procedure necessary to perfect the lien; but when the claimant's right has been clearly established, the law will be liberally interpreted toward accomplishing the purposes of its enactment. Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 1963-NMSC-109, 72 N.M. 259, 382 P.2d 983.

The Mechanics' Lien Law, though in derogation of the common law, is remedial in its nature and is to have a liberal construction. Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 1963-NMSC-109, 72 N.M. 259, 382 P.2d 983.

The act is in fact remedial in nature and should be liberally construed. Home Plumbing & Contracting Co. v. Pruitt, 1962-NMSC-075, 70 N.M. 182, 372 P.2d 378.

Lien statutory, not equitable. — The lien is of statutory, not equitable, origin. It depends wholly upon the existence of certain conditions and the performance by the claimant of a prescribed act. The absence of the conditions or the nonperformance of the act leaves equity powerless. The court's function is not to create a lien. It can only declare and enforce an existing lien. Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 1963-NMSC-109, 72 N.M. 259, 382 P.2d 983.

This article applies to mechanics and materialmen. Hobbs v. Morrison Supply Co., 1937-NMSC-060, 41 N.M. 644, 73 P.2d 325.

Contract for vendor's lien. — An executory contract for the sale of land, reserving legal title in the vendor until payment, does not create a vendor's lien. Albuquerque Lumber Co. v. Tomei, 1926-NMSC-033, 32 N.M. 5, 250 P. 21.

California cases followed. — The New Mexico supreme court has consistently followed the pertinent decisions of the California courts in cases in which the mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes have been involved. Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 1963-NMSC-109, 72 N.M. 259, 382 P.2d 983.

Unjust enrichment basis for statutory lien. — The Miller Act, § 270(b), Title 40, U.S.C.A. (now 40 U.S.C. § 3133), is not a lien statute, but merely provides a remedy for recovery of monies due for the doing of work or furnishing of materials provided for in the contract mentioned in Subsection (a) of the act; thus, the right of the claimant must relate to the provisions of the construction contract under the Miller Act and similar state statutes. With reference to mechanics' and materialmen's statutes, the rule is that the right relates to the benefit inuring to the property and arises from the equitable principle of unjust enrichment. Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 1963-NMSC-109, 72 N.M. 259, 382 P.2d 983.

Law reviews. — For survey of construction law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 331 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics' Liens §§ 12, 25, 39 et seq., 251 et seq.

What constitutes "commencement of building or improvement" for purposes of determining accrual of lien, 1 A.L.R.3d 822.

56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 2, 121.