(a) An appeal may be taken from:

(1) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;

(2) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;

(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;

(4) an order modifying or correcting an award;

(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or

(6) a final judgment entered pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act [44-7A-1 NMSA 1978].

(b) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment in a civil action.

History: Laws 2001, ch. 227, § 29.

Compiler's note. — Laws 2002, ch. 227, § 33 repealed the former Uniform Arbitration Act, Sections 44-7-1 to 44-7-22 NMSA 1978, enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 168, §23. The Uniform Arbitration Act compiled as 44-7A-1 to 44-7A-32 NMSA 1978 was enacted effective July 1, 2001.

Cross references. — For appeals generally, see Rules 12-201 to 12-216 NMRA.

Untimely appeal. — Where, in an arbitration between a construction company and a hotel owner, the arbitrator determined an award in favor of the construction company which the hotel owner paid in full, including the award of attorney fees; almost one year later, in response to the district court's inquiry about the status of the arbitration, the construction company asked the district court to confirm the award and the hotel owner asked the district court to review the award of attorney fees; the district court confirmed the arbitration award, with the exception of the award of attorney fees, and remanded the question of attorney fees to the arbitrator for review; and the hotel owner never contested the arbitrator's award within the statutory deadlines for doing so, the hotel owner forfeited any right it might have had to contest the award in district court because, although the order of remand was appealable, as both an order confirming the award and denying the construction company's motion to confirm the award of attorney fees, the hotel owner failed to use the statutory remedies to challenge the award of attorney fees for almost a year. Journeyman Constr., LP v. Premier Hospitality II, 2013-NMCA-019, 293 P.3d 950.

Record on appeal to contain evidence of claims regarding vacation of award. — Where a party claims that the trial court should vacate the award because the arbitrator allegedly evidenced partiality and exceeded his powers, and the trial court judge reviews the record of the arbitration proceedings, but his findings do not indicate whether the record contains substantial evidence supporting or negating such claims, nor is the record of the arbitration proceedings made a part of the record for appeal, the case will be remanded to the district court to determine whether the arbitration record supports confirmation, or, in the alternative, vacation or modification of the award. Daniels Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Jordan, 1982-NMSC-148, 99 N.M. 297, 657 P.2d 624.

Appellee may argue any grounds for affirmance. — An appellee who does not claim that the trial court erred in vacating an arbitration award has no duty to preserve that issue on appeal. It may argue any grounds for affirmance on appeal and the appellate court will uphold the trial court's decision if it is legally mandated, regardless of whether the trial court's rationale was wrong. Bruch v. CNA Ins. Co., 1994-NMSC-020, 117 N.M. 211, 870 P.2d 749, overruled on other grounds by Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-NMSC-011, 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901.

Standard of review. — When reviewing whether the district court correctly confirmed an arbitration award, the appellate court determines whether substantial evidence in the record supports the district court's findings of fact and whether the court correctly applied the law to the facts when making its conclusions of law. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. When determining whether a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to uphold the finding and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the district court's decision. Town of Silver City v. Garcia, 1993-NMSC-037, 115 N.M. 628, 857 P.2d 28.

Waiver of right to compel arbitration. — Three principles govern appellate review of a district court's waiver finding in the context of a motion to compel arbitration: (1) the strong public policy preference in favor of arbitration, (2) relief should only be granted upon a showing of prejudice to the party opposing arbitration, and (3) the extent to which the party now urging arbitration has previously invoked the machinery of the judicial system. Tennyson v. Santa Fe Dealership Acquisition II, Inc., 2016-NMCA-017, cert. denied, 2016-NMCERT-001.

Where defendants were alleged to have sold used cars to plaintiffs and others without disclosing the cars' accident history, plaintiffs filed a putative class-action lawsuit against defendants, and after nearly three years of extensive litigation, discovery, and an order certifying the action did defendants file a motion to compel arbitration. There was no error in the district court's finding that defendants' use of the judicial process, moving for dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, engaging in extensive discovery, filing multiple motions for summary judgment, opposing class certification and appealing the district court's certification order, all while omitting any mention of an intent to compel arbitration, invoked the machinery of litigation in a manner inconsistent with their right to arbitrate and manifested an intent to waive their right to compel arbitration against absent class members to a degree that plaintiffs and the district court could properly rely. Tennyson v. Santa Fe Dealership Acquisition II, Inc., 2016-NMCA-017, cert. denied, 2016-NMCERT-001.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Appealability of order or decree compelling or refusing to compel arbitration, 94 A.L.R.2d 1071, 6 A.L.R.4th 652.

Appealability of judgment confirming or setting aside arbitration award, 7 A.L.R.3d 608.

Appealability of state court's order of decree compelling or refusing to compel arbitration, 6 A.L.R.4th 652.

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: enforceability of policy provision limiting appeals from arbitration, 23 A.L.R.5th 801.