As used in the Family Violence Protection Act:
A. "continuing personal relationship" means a dating or intimate relationship;
B. "co-parents" means persons who have a child in common, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time;
C. "court" means the district court of the judicial district where an alleged victim of domestic abuse resides or is found;
D. "domestic abuse":
(1) means an incident of stalking or sexual assault whether committed by a household member or not;
(2) means an incident by a household member against another household member consisting of or resulting in:
(a) physical harm;
(b) severe emotional distress;
(c) bodily injury or assault;
(d) a threat causing imminent fear of bodily injury by any household member;
(e) criminal trespass;
(f) criminal damage to property;
(g) repeatedly driving by a residence or work place;
(h) telephone harassment;
(i) harassment;
(j) strangulation;
(k) suffocation; or
(l) harm or threatened harm to children as set forth in this paragraph; and
(3) does not mean the use of force in self-defense or the defense of another;
E. "firearm" means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosion or the frame or receiver of any such weapon;
F. "household member" means a spouse, former spouse, parent, present or former stepparent, present or former parent-in-law, grandparent, grandparent-in-law, child, stepchild, grandchild, co-parent of a child or a person with whom the petitioner has had a continuing personal relationship. Cohabitation is not necessary to be deemed a household member for purposes of this section;
G. "law enforcement officer" means a public official or public officer vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes;
H. "mutual order of protection" means an order of protection that includes provisions that protect both parties;
I. "order of protection" means an injunction or a restraining or other court order granted for the protection of a victim of domestic abuse;
J. "protected party" means a person protected by an order of protection;
K. "restrained party" means a person who is restrained by an order of protection;
L. "strangulation" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 30-3-11 NMSA 1978; and
M. "suffocation" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 30-3-11 NMSA 1978.
History: Laws 1987, ch. 286, § 2; 1993, ch. 109, § 1; 1995, ch. 23, § 3; 2008, ch. 40, § 2; 2010, ch. 85, § 2; 2018, ch. 30, § 4; 2019, ch. 253, § 2.
The 2019 amendment, effective July 1, 2019, defined "firearm" and "law enforcement officer" as used in the Family Violence Protection Act; added new Subsection E and redesignated former Subsection E as Subsection F; and added Subsection G and redesignated former Subsections F through K as Subsections H through M, respectively.
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, included "strangulation" and "suffocation" within the definition of "domestic abuse", and added definitions of "strangulation" and "suffocation" to the Family Violence Protection Act; in Subsection D, added new Subparagraphs D(2)(j) and D(2)(k) and redesignated former Subparagraph D(2)(j) as D(2)(l); and added Subsections J and K.
The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, added Subsection A; in Subsection E, after "former spouse", deleted "family member, including a relative"; after second instance of "present or former", added "parent"; after "parent in-law", added "grandparent, grandparent-in-law"; and after "grandparent-in-law, child", added "stepchild, grandchild".
The 2008 amendment, effective July 1, 2008, added Paragraphs (1) and (3) of Subsection C and Subsections E, G and H; deleted "stalking" in Paragraph (2) of Subsection C; and added "a injunction and restraining order" in Subsection F.
The 1995 amendment, effective June 16, 1995, in the first sentence in Subsection D, inserted "parent, present or former step-parent, present or former in-law" following "relative" and inserted "or" preceding "co-parent".
The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, in Subsection C, inserted "by a household member against another household member" in the introductory language, added the paragraph designations, added Paragraphs (2) and (5) through (11), and made several minor stylistic changes; and, in Subsection D, substituted "including a relative, child" for "present or former household member or", added "or a person with whom the petitioner has had a continuing personal relationship" at the end of the first sentence, and added the last sentence.
Domestic abuse. — Where the facts of a case, taken as a whole, show repeated incidents that come within the terms of Subsection C (now D) of this section, the evidence does make out a case of domestic abuse. Lujan v. Casados-Lujan, 2004-NMCA-036, 135 N.M. 285, 87 P.3d 1067, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-003 135 N.M. 319, 88 P.3d 261.
Meaning of "severe emotional distress" interpreted. — "Severe emotional distress" is characterized by great harm to a person's mental health and well-being. Best v. Marino, 2017-NMCA-073, cert. denied.
Respondent's conduct constituted "severe emotional distress". — Where respondent appealed the district court's finding that respondent violated an order of protection that prohibited her from contacting petitioner and from committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse against petitioner, evidence that respondent posted on the internet numerous photos of petitioner snorting prescription drugs, which were accompanied by statements claiming that petitioner was a "junkie", "a drug-addled imbecile", and a "drug-addicted hypocrite", and testimony from petitioner regarding the adverse effects, including nightmares and thoughts of suicide, that respondent's conduct had on petitioner's life, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondent's online activity caused petitioner severe emotional distress. Best v. Marino, 2017-NMCA-073, cert. denied.
Trial in metropolitan court. — All acts of domestic abuse as defined in Subsection C (now D) should be tried on-record in the metropolitan court. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Sanchez, 1997-NMSC-021, 123 N.M. 165, 936 P.2d 334.