A. When a defendant is convicted of a second violent sexual offense, and each violent sexual offense conviction is part of a separate transaction or occurrence, and at least the second violent sexual offense conviction is in New Mexico, the defendant shall, in addition to the punishment imposed for the second violent sexual offense conviction, be punished by a sentence of life imprisonment. The life imprisonment sentence shall be subject to parole pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978.
B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection A of this section, when a defendant is convicted of a second violent sexual offense, and each violent sexual offense conviction is part of a separate transaction or occurrence, and the victim of each violent sexual offense was less than thirteen years of age at the time of the offense, and at least the second violent sexual offense conviction is in New Mexico, the defendant shall be punished by a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
C. The sentence of life imprisonment shall be imposed after a sentencing hearing, separate from the trial or guilty plea proceeding resulting in the second violent sexual offense conviction, pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-26 NMSA 1978.
D. For the purposes of this section, a violent sexual offense conviction incurred by a defendant before the defendant reaches the age of eighteen shall not count as a violent sexual offense conviction.
E. When a defendant has a felony conviction from another state, the felony conviction shall be considered a violent sexual offense for the purposes of the Criminal Sentencing Act if the crime would be considered a violent sexual offense in New Mexico.
F. As used in the Criminal Sentencing Act, "violent sexual offense" means:
(1) criminal sexual penetration in the first degree, as provided in Subsection D of Section 30-9-11 NMSA 1978; or
(2) criminal sexual penetration in the second degree, as provided in Subsection E of Section 30-9-11 NMSA 1978.
History: 1978 Comp., § 31-18-25, enacted by Laws 1996, ch. 79, § 1; 1997, ch. 140, § 1; 2015, ch. 12, § 1.
The 2015 amendment, effective June 19, 2015, made technical corrections to the Criminal Sentencing Act by providing the correct citations for criminal sexual penetration in the first degree and criminal sexual penetration in the second degree in the NMSA 1978; in Subsection D, after "before", deleted "he" and added "the defendant"; in Paragraph (1) of Subsection F, after "Subsection", deleted "C" and added "D"; in Paragraph (2) of Subsection F, after "Subsection", deleted "D" and added "E".
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, added Subsection B; redesignated former Subsections B through E as C through F; and rewrote Subsection F.
Definition of "violent sexual offense". — In 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree for raping a fourteen-year-old minor; ten years later, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree for raping a fifteen-year-old minor; defendant argued that the state could not use 31-18-25(A) NMSA 1978 to sentence defendant to life imprisonment for a second "violent sexual offense" because 31-18-25(F)(2) NMSA 1978 defined "violent sexual offense" by reference to 30-9-11(D) NMSA 1978 which had been amended in 2007 to define criminal sexual penetration in the first degree; and the 2007 amendments moved the definition of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree to Subsection E of 30-9-11 NMSA 1978, but did not change the definition, the reorganization of 30-9-11 NMSA 1978 by the 2007 amendments did not deprive the district court of the authority to impose a life sentence upon defendant because the authority was provided in 31-18-25(A) NMSA 1978 which refers to a second violent sexual offense. State ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez, 2014-NMSC-022.
Multiple enhancements authorized. — This section authorizes the imposition of multiple enhancements for multiple current convictions. State v. McClendon, 2001-NMSC-023, 130 N.M. 551, 28 P.3d 1092.