A. The secretary is the governing authority and shall have control, management and direction of all public schools, except as otherwise provided by law.

B. The department may:

(1) adopt, promulgate and enforce rules to exercise its authority and the authority of the secretary;

(2) enter into contracts to carry out its duties;

(3) apply to the district court for an injunction, writ of mandamus or other appropriate relief to enforce the provisions of the Public School Code [Chapter 22 [except Article 5A] NMSA 1978] or rules promulgated pursuant to the Public School Code; and

(4) waive provisions of the Public School Code as authorized by law.

History: 1978 Comp., § 22-2-1, enacted by Laws 1990 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 10; 1992, ch. 77, § 1; 1993, ch. 226, § 2; 2003, ch. 143, § 2; 2004, ch. 27, § 14.

Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1990 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 10 repealed former 22-2-1 NMSA 1978, as amended by Laws 1990, ch. 52, § 1, and enacted a new section, effective June 18, 1990.

Cross references. — For constitutional provision relating to state board of education, see N.M. Const., art. XII, § 6.

For the public education department and commission, see 9-24-5, 9-24-10 and 9-24-15 NMSA 1978.

The 2004 amendment, effective May 19, 2004, amended Subsection A to change "state board" to "secretary", amended Subsection B to change "state board" to "department", added a new Subparagraph (2) providing for the power of the department to enter into contracts and redesignated former Subsections C and D as Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Subsection B.

The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, deleted former Subsection D, pertaining to approval by the state board of a local school board's request to waive provisions of the Public School Code relating to length of school day, staffing patterns, subject areas or the purchase of instructional materials; redesignated former Subsection E as Subsection D; and rewrote present Subsection D, which formerly authorized the state board to waive provisions of the Public School Code relating to staffing patterns, class and teaching leads, subject areas, curriculum, testing, instructional time or the purchase of instructional materials.

The 1992 amendment, effective May 20, 1992, inserted "or the purchase of instructional materials" in the first sentence of Subsection D and near the middle of Subsection E; and made minor stylistic changes throughout the section.

Authority of secretary of public education to revoke teachers' licenses. — Article XII, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution, the Uniform Licensing Act, Sections 61-1-1 et seq. NMSA 1978, the Public Education Department Act, Chapter 9, Article 24 NMSA 1978, the Public School Code, Chapter 22 NMSA 1978, and the School Personnel Act, Chapter 22, Article 10A NMSA 1978, do not preclude the secretary of public education from having exclusive authority to make the final decision to revoke a teacher's license. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d 469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Secretary's authority to disregard hearing officer's credibility determination. — Where plaintiff was charged with engaging in inappropriate and improper sexual behavior with a fourteen-year-old victim at a charter school; a hearing officer found that the charges against plaintiff had not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and recommended that the disciplinary action against plaintiff be dismissed; the secretary of public education reviewed the record before the hearing officer, adopted some of the hearing officer's recommendations and rejected others, and concluded that a preponderance of the evidence warranted revocation and revoked plaintiff's license to teach; the essential difference between the hearing officer's view of the case and that of the secretary was how they viewed the credibility of plaintiff and the victim and the believability of their testimony; the regulations of the public education department provided that the hearing officer had the duty to make proposed findings and conclusions; the secretary was not an appellate reviewer of the hearing officer's findings and conclusions, the secretary had the authority, after reviewing the record, to modify the hearing officer's findings and conclusions; and the secretary was ultimately responsible for issuing a final decision; and after reviewing the record, the secretary made independent findings of fact that were supported by references to the hearing transcript, the secretary did not exceed the secretary's authority by making the secretary's own credibility or fact-based determinations. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d 469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Revocation of teacher's license did not violate due process. — Where plaintiff was charged with engaging in inappropriate and improper sexual behavior with a fourteen-year-old victim at a charter school; a hearing officer found that the charges against plaintiff had not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, based in part on the credibility of the witnesses, and recommended that the disciplinary action against plaintiff be dismissed; the secretary of public education reviewed the record and concluded that a preponderance of the evidence warranted revocation; the secretary's conclusions were supported by the record and were based on the secretary's analysis of the facts presented by the witnesses, the contradictions in the facts, and the victim's written statement, plaintiff was not denied due process by the fact that the secretary failed to observe the witnesses' demeanor or by the secretary's failure to defer to the hearing officer's proposed findings of fact. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d 469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Revocation of teacher's license was supported by substantial evidence. — Where plaintiff was charged with engaging in inappropriate and improper sexual behavior with a fourteen-year-old victim; the victim was considering attending the charter school; the owners and operators of the school, who were the godparents of the victim, hosted an event in their home; the victim and plaintiff stayed overnight and slept in the living room where the alleged contact occurred when the victim and plaintiff were alone, the decision of the secretary of public education to revoke plaintiff's teacher's license was supported by substantial evidence. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d 469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

State board has powers implied from statute. — The authority of the state board in the rule- or regulation-making context is not limited to those powers expressly granted by statute, but includes all powers that may be fairly implied therefrom. Redman v. Board of Regents, 1984-NMCA-117, 102 N.M. 234, 693 P.2d 1266, cert. denied, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1985).

Board may determine action not "good cause" for firing. — It is within the province of the state board to decide that a private affair between consenting adults, an assistant principal and a school secretary, is not "good and just cause" to fire an employee. Board of Educ. v. Jennings, 1982-NMCA-135, 98 N.M. 602, 651 P.2d 1037.

Legislative power as to duties of state board. — The authority granted the state board for the "control, management and direction of all public schools" under N.M. Const., art. XII, § 6 must be specifically defined by the legislature and the legislature may divest the state board of duties previously defined. N.M. Const., art. XII, § 6 does not, in itself, vest the state board with any particular duties and the legislature is empowered to determine the scope of the board's authority. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-06.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Validity of local or state denial of public school courses or activities to private or parochial school students, 43 A.L.R.4th 776.