Such records shall be notice to all the world of the existence and contents of the instruments so recorded from the time of recording.

History: Laws 1886-1887, ch. 10, § 2; C.L. 1897, § 3954; Code 1915, § 4787; C.S. 1929, § 118-109; 1941 Comp., § 13-202; 1953 Comp., § 71-2-2.

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.

Cross references. — For recording assignment of royalties, see 70-1-1, 70-1-2 NMSA 1978.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

False or void instruments. — Only valid instruments are authorized to be filed or recorded, of which purchasers are charged with notice and if a false or void instrument purporting upon its face to be conveyance is recorded, the record, like the instrument, is void and does not protect a purchaser. Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1941-NMSC-028, 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740.

Purpose. — Sections 14-9-1 and 14-9-3 NMSA 1978 are not intended to protect creditors of the owners of property, but to impart information to those dealing with the property respecting its transfer and encumbrances. First Nat'l Bank v. Haverkampf, 1911-NMSC-053, 16 N.M. 497, 121 P. 31, aff'd, 235 U.S. 689, 35 S. Ct. 204, 59 L. Ed. 426 (1914); Ilfeld v. de Baca, 1905-NMSC-007, 13 N.M. 32, 79 P. 723, rev'd on other grounds, 1907-NMSC-014, 14 N.M. 65, 89 P. 244 (decided prior to 1923 amendment of 14-9-3 NMSA 1978).

A deed recorded in a county where the property is not located is ineffective as constructive notice. Christmas v. Cowden, 1940-NMSC-051, 44 N.M. 517, 105 P.2d 484.

Seller under real estate contract holds perfected interest in property by virtue of recording his interest pursuant to this article. Connelly v. Wertz, 1993-NMCA-090, 115 N.M. 803, 858 P.2d 1282, overruled on other grounds, Southwest Land Inv., Inc. v. Hubbart, 1993-NMSC-072, 116 N.M. 742, 867 P.2d 412.

All documents affecting title to real property recorded in county records are constructive notice to the world of their existence from the time of recordation. Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, 135 N.M. 180, 86 P.3d 605.

No time requirement for recording instruments. — There is no requirement that an instrument be recorded within a particular period of time; the order in which deeds appear on the record is not important in a notice jurisdiction. Angle v. Slayton, 1985-NMSC-032, 102 N.M. 521, 697 P.2d 940.

Construed in pari materia. — This section must be considered with 14-9-3 NMSA 1978, with which it is in pari materia. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Necessity of notice. — To bind a purchaser of a servient estate by a servitude charged thereon, he must have notice thereof, either actual or constructive, as in case of other encumbrances upon land. Southern Union Gas Co. v. Cantrell, 1952-NMSC-024, 56 N.M. 184, 241 P.2d 1209.

Service by publication against "unknown claimants of interest" in quiet title action does not affect the title of a person whose deed to that property is on record in the deed records of the county in which the real estate in question is located. Houchen v. Hubbell, 1969-NMSC-162, 80 N.M. 764, 461 P.2d 413.

Constructive service proper where names and addresses of defendants are not reasonably ascertainable. — In a collateral attack on a 1948 quiet title judgment in San Juan county, in which service of process was accomplished by publication in a weekly newspaper, and where the plaintiffs in the 1948 complaint alleged that after diligent search and inquiry, they had been unable to learn or determine the names, places of residence, addresses and whereabouts of any unknown heirs of any deceased defendants or if any defendants were still living and residing in New Mexico, they could not be located because they had secreted themselves so that personal service of process could not be effected, and where the return of service completed by the sheriff of San Juan county indicated that after diligent search and inquiry, any predecessors-in-interest could not be located and personally served with process, the district court correctly found that the suit in this case constituted an improper collateral attack on the 1948 judgment quieting title in defendants' predecessors-in-interest, because constructive notice given in the underlying case was sufficiently reasonably calculated under the circumstances as they existed in 1948; constructive service of process by publication satisfies due process if the names and addresses of the defendants to be served are not reasonably ascertainable. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P'ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp., 2017-NMSC-004, rev'g 2015-NMCA-004, 340 P.3d 1277.

Lack of notice. — This section does not impose a duty upon the owner of an interest in real property to constantly peruse the records of the county clerk to determine whether he or she has been divested of his or her property right in a lawsuit of which he or she was not notified. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P'ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp., 2015-NMCA-004, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-012.

Quiet title action. — In quiet title action, where defendants failed to undertake a diligent and good faith effort to personally serve the owners of an interest in real property with adequate notice of quiet title suit, constructive notice was not constitutionally adequate. T.H. McElvain Oil & Gas Ltd. P'ship v. Benson-Montin-Greer Drilling Corp., 2015-NMCA-004, cert. granted, 2014-NMCERT-012.

Appropriations for judicial salaries are subject to governor's veto power. — Judicial salaries must annually be established by the legislature in an appropriations act, as set forth in Subsection E of 34-1-9 NMSA 1978, and are subject to the governor's partial veto authority. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-NMSC-001.

Governor's partial veto must eliminate the whole of an item to be valid. — Where the legislature provided for two separate judicial raises in two separate appropriations, the governor's partial veto of one appropriation failed to eliminate the second appropriation providing for judicial raises. State ex rel. Cisneros v. Martinez, 2015-NMSC-001.

Fraud. — The recording of a deed must be accompanied by other circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person upon inquiry in order for the recording to act as constructive notice of fraud. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Failure to record mortgage promptly does not constitute a fraud in law as to subsequent creditors. First Nat'l Bank v. Haverkampf, 1911-NMSC-053, 16 N.M. 497, 121 P. 31, aff'd, 235 U.S. 689, 35 S. Ct. 204, 59 L. Ed. 426 (1914).

Date of recording tax sale certificate does not affect period of redemption. Hiltscher v. Jones, 1917-NMSC-089, 23 N.M. 674, 170 P. 884, appeal dismissed, 251 U.S. 545, 40 S. Ct. 218, 64 L. Ed. 407 (1920).

Recorded deed of trust was superior to the unrecorded interest of an investor who admitted he had actual notice of the recorded interest, and the existing priorities were not affected by the appointment of a receiver. Kuntsman v. Guaranteed Equities, Inc., 1986-NMSC-083, 105 N.M. 49, 728 P.2d 459.

Estoppel. — Where defendant and her husband had entered into a property settlement agreement which provided that after-acquired property would belong exclusively to the acquiring party and such recorded agreement was later repudiated by defendant in a recorded affidavit, but later ratified and confirmed in another recorded affidavit, plaintiffs, who had purchased property from husband, were innocent purchasers for value and entitled to rely on the record, and defendant was estopped by her conduct from asserting the invalidity of the property settlement. Allison v. Curtis, 1957-NMSC-036, 62 N.M. 387, 310 P.2d 1042.

Priority of interests in bankruptcy. — Since priority of interest of competing lienholders is determined by the date of recording under New Mexico's recording statutes (Sections 14-9-1 to 14-9-3 NMSA 1978), the second mortgage on debtor's property, as the only recorded lien of record, had priority over the trustee's interest as unperfected lienholder after avoidance of first mortgage holder's unrecorded and therefore unperfected security interest. In re Beltramo, 367 B.R. 825 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007).

II. PERSONS CHARGED WITH NOTICE.

Land ownership and well-sharing agreement. — Where the owners of adjoining ranches entered into a written land ownership and well-sharing agreement to clarify the ownership of certain property and to provide for sharing of water from two wells; the agreement was recorded in each county in which the land and wells were located; and one landowner sold the landowner's ranch to a third party and orally advised the buyer of the existence of the agreement, the buyer had constructive notice of the agreement and had a duty to inquire about the agreement. Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, 146 N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531.

Constructive notice of restrictive covenant in deed. — Because a deed containing a restrictive covenant was recorded, the defendant had constructive notice of the covenant. Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., Inc., 1983-NMSC-073, 100 N.M. 389, 671 P.2d 637.

Constructive notice in recorded deed of trust. — Pursuant to the policy underlying the recording statutes, Sections 14-9-1 and -2 NMSA 1978, priority in the proceeds of collateral underlying petitioners' loans would be determined by the order in which the deeds of trust were recorded; there was no question that the "master" deed of trust issued to Group I was duly recorded first and that the latter deeds were expressly made subject to it, so the investors in Group II and Group III thus had record notice of the existence of the first deed of trust, in addition to actual notice in some cases. McInerny v. Peterson, 1986-NMSC-099, 105 N.M. 207, 730 P.2d 1189.

"All the world" means those bound to search record. — "All the world" has been limited to mean those persons who are bound to search the record, and it is to such persons only that the law imputes constructive notice; subsequent purchasers are charged with such notice. Angle v. Slayton, 1985-NMSC-032, 102 N.M. 521, 697 P.2d 940.

Constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. — Subsequent purchasers are charged with such constructive notice of the contents of recorded instruments pursuant to Section 14-9-2 NMSA 1978, since the term "all the world" has been limited to mean persons who are bound to search the record, and it is only these persons that the law imputes with constructive notice. Allen v. Timberlake Ranch Landowners Ass'n, 2005-NMCA-115, 138 N.M. 318, 119 P.3d 743.

Constructive notice to laborers. — Claimants had constructive notice that title to the real estate upon which they allegedly performed labor had been previously conveyed to the grantee, where two deeds given to the grantee were both filed and recorded. In re Estates of Salas, 1987-NMCA-018, 105 N.M. 472, 734 P.2d 250.

Record of instrument is constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers only and does not affect prior parties. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Who bound to search. — Those who, by the terms of the recording laws, are charged with constructive notice of the record of an instrument affecting land are, therefore, those who are bound to search the records for that particular instrument. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

Jury question. — If, considering all the surrounding facts and circumstances, a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary diligence would have made inquiry as to the state of the record, he is chargeable with knowledge that such inquiry would have revealed from the time that it ought to have been made. This raises a factual issue for resolution by the trier of the facts. Romero v. Sanchez, 1971-NMSC-129, 83 N.M. 358, 492 P.2d 140.

III. SCOPE OF NOTICE.

Scope of notice. — Where information of a specific claim or right is given to a person or to the world by recordation of an instrument manifesting such claim or right, the information contained therein is operative only in respect to the particular facts communicated thereby, and it will not serve to put the parties charged with such notice upon inquiry as to any other or different right. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1943).

"Knowledge" does not necessarily mean "actual knowledge," but means knowledge of such circumstances as would ordinarily lead to a knowledge of the actual facts. In its broadest interpretation, it means constructive notice. Recitals in a quitclaim deed of existence of agreements, rights of redemption and mortgages charged the grantee with notice of an unrecorded warranty deed. Taylor v. Hanchett Oil Co., 1933-NMSC-099, 37 N.M. 606, 27 P.2d 59.

Person who files and records leases long after others sued to foreclose vendor's lien for balance of the purchase price and filed lis pendens notice in same county clerk's office is deemed to have notice that his interest was attacked in the action, and his interest is inferior to the lien of the vendor. Logan v. Emro Chem. Corp., 1944-NMSC-044, 48 N.M. 368, 151 P.2d 329.

Effect of recording agreement. — Purchaser's written agreement to execute a second mortgage on property when buildings were constructed on the land, or within one year from date of sale, when filed for record, constituted constructive notice to all the world of its existence and contents. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1943).

An agreement as notice of a vendor's lien. — Vendor's recordation of agreement with buyer of vacant land that when buildings were erected or in one year after date of sale buyer was to give vendor a second mortgage on the property did not give constructive notice to a surety on the buyer's note of the vendor's intention to reserve a vendor's lien, and a mortgage executed to the surety to secure his signature to a renewal note had priority over the vendor's lien. Zumwalt v. Goodwin, 133 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1943).

Recording of short form memorandum of agreement gave notice that defendant was claiming some right to real estate under this section. Bingaman v. Cook, 1968-NMSC-187, 79 N.M. 627, 447 P.2d 507.

Reference in contract to improvement agreement. — An unrecorded improvement agreement, referred to in a recorded contract of sale, is in the chain of title. Camino Real Enters., Inc. v. Ortega, 1988-NMSC-061, 107 N.M. 387, 758 P.2d 801.

Recorded chattel mortgage of crops to be raised is constructive notice of the existence and contents of the mortgage, even though the land is generally but not particularly described, where description could be aided by reasonable inquiry. Security State Bank v. Clovis Mill & Elevator Co., 1937-NMSC-029, 41 N.M. 341, 68 P.2d 918.

Reliance on record. — An investigator may rely upon the truth of recitals contained in the record when they are specific. Smith & Ricker v. Hill Bros., 1913-NMSC-004, 17 N.M. 415, 134 P. 243.

Priority of claims in bankruptcy. — Pursuant to New Mexico recordation statute (Section 14-9-1 NMSA 1978), the ownership interests of the debtor and his wife as to good faith purchasers and judgment lien creditors were delineated by the recorded deed stating that they owned the subject property as joint tenants. In re Beery, 295 B.R. 385 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §§ 90, 96; 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws §§ 88, 102 to 155; 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser §§ 663 to 669.