When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, but direct evidence is introduced contrary to the existence of the presumed fact, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is determined as follows:
1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact.
2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence does not render the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the presumed fact.
3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact unless they find from the direct evidence that its nonexistence is more probable than its existence, in which event they should find against its existence.
(Added to NRS by 1971, 778)