Effective 02 Jan 1979, see footnote

537.020. Action for personal injury or death to survive regardless of death of either party. — 1. Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death, nor by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued; but in case of the death of either or both such parties, such cause of action shall survive to the personal representative of such injured party, and against the person, receiver or corporation liable for such injuries and his legal representatives, and the liability and the measure of damages shall be the same as if such death or deaths had not occurred. Causes of action for death shall not abate by reason of the death of any party to any such cause of action, but shall survive to the personal representative of such party bringing such cause of action and against the person, receiver or corporation liable for such death and his or its legal representatives.

2. The right of action for death or the right of action for personal injury that does not result in the death shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the appointment of a personal representative by the probate division of the circuit court upon the written application therefor by one or more of the beneficiaries of the deceased. The existence of the right of action for death or personal injury that does not result in death shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the appointment of a personal representative for the person liable for such death or injury by the court having probate jurisdiction upon his death upon the written application of any person interested in such right of action for death or injury.

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(RSMo 1939 § 3670, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 225, A.L. 1949 p. 633, A.L. 1955 p. 780, A.L. 1977 S.B. 147, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1634)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3280; 1919 § 4231; 1909 § 5438

Effective 1-02-79

(1971) Where parents of deceased child were not made defendants in plaintiff's suit against child's administrator, they could not bring themselves into that action as counter-claimants for wrongful death. State ex rel. Saupe v. Swink (A.), 475 S.W.2d 466.

(1975) Wrongful death action of husband for wife's death abated on his death sixteen days later and did not pass to his personal representative. Pedroli v. Missouri Pacific Railroad (A.), 524 S.W.2d 882.