If the mortgagor or owner of the mortgaged premises, or other interested person for whose relief Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 are enacted, shall make default in the carrying charge payments, or any of them, required in the order mentioned in the foregoing section, or shall commit any waste, his or her right to a further postponement of a final sale shall terminate thirty (30) days after such default, and the mortgagee or trustee or other persons having the right to foreclose shall thereupon be entitled to apply to the court in termtime or vacation for a final decree of sale upon a satisfactory showing to the court that the default aforesaid has occurred; provided that if the default be explained on the grounds of casualty, inevitable accident, or other good reason wholly beyond the control of the defaulter, and be one which in the judgment of the court can be remedied and made good by the defaulter within a reasonably short period to be fixed by the court, then the court or chancellor in vacation shall have power to excuse the default and to make such order in reference thereto as may be just and equitable. The chancellor shall have power in vacation, at any time after the period mentioned in Section 89-1-303, to hear and determine and to order or decree in respect to any matter that shall arise under Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, to the same extent and as fully as the court could do in termtime, legal notice having been given to all parties of the said hearing in vacation. The court or chancellor in vacation shall have power to revoke the period of extension theretofore granted for the making of the final order of sale in case it may be made to appear to the chancellor in vacation, or to the court in termtime, that the occasion for said postponement no longer exists or is no longer just and reasonable; and, in general, the court, or chancellor in vacation, shall have power to alter and revise its orders theretofore made in any respect insofar as the changed circumstances and conditions may require. Provided further, that prior to two (2) years from the date of the disaster declaration by the governor in which he specifically included the relief provided for in Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329, no action shall be maintained in this state for a deficiency judgment until the period of time extension allowed in any proceeding begun under the provisions of Sections 89-1-301 through 89-1-329 shall have expired.