§657-13 Infancy, insanity, imprisonment. If any person entitled to bring any action specified in this part (excepting actions against the sheriff, chief of police, or other officers) is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either:

(1) Within the age of eighteen years;

(2) Insane; or

(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than the person's natural life;

such person shall be at liberty to bring such actions within the respective times limited in this part, after the disability is removed or at any time while the disability exists. [CC 1859, §1039; RL 1925, §2648; RL 1935, §3919; RL 1945, §10430; RL 1955, §241-12; am L 1963, c 13, §1 and c 85, §3; HRS §657-13; am L 1972, c 2, §37(1); gen ch 1985; am L 1989, c 211, §10; am L 1990, c 281, §11]

Revision Note

Pursuant to §23G-15, in:

(1) Paragraph (1) "or," deleted; and

(2) Paragraph (2), punctuation deleted.

Law Journals and Reviews

Tort and Insurance "Reform" in a Common Law Court. 14 UH L. Rev. 55 (1992).

Case Notes

Hybrid §301 Labor Management Relations Act/fair representation claim not tolled by this section. 817 F. Supp. 850 (1992).

Deed of minor may be disaffirmed within reasonable time after majority attained. 30 H. 184 (1927).

Mentally enfeebled person not barred by statute though suit for cancellation of deed more than six years from execution. 31 H. 817, 901 (1931).

Laches is not imputable to one mentally incapacitated to execute valid deed. 31 H. 817 (1931).

Amendment reducing period of infancy, during which statute of limitations is tolled, from twenty to eighteen years had effect of accelerating the date on which the limitation statute commences to run so that action not brought within two years after plaintiff had reached eighteen was barred. 58 H. 101, 564 P.2d 1276 (1977).

Section applies to the limitations period provided in §663-3. 63 H. 273, 626 P.2d 182 (1981).

Not applicable to actions against the State. 72 H. 77, 806 P.2d 957 (1991).

Tolls statute of limitations for tort actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents during victims' minority. 72 H. 377, 819 P.2d 80 (1991).

Considering the definition of insanity and construing summary judgment liberally in favor of non-movant, affidavits of doctors that patient was mentally incompetent to manage patient's legal and business affairs were sufficient to invoke tolling provisions of this section. 89 H. 244, 971 P.2d 717 (1999).

Because the city is neither the sovereign nor the surrogate or alter ego of the sovereign, it is not entitled to sovereign immunity; thus, it is subject to the State's tort laws in the same manner as any private tortfeasor; as this section governs classes of "personal" tort actions, such as "damage to persons or property", the infancy tolling provision of paragraph (1) applies directly to personal injury actions against the city; child was thus able to bring action, but as paragraph (1) did not provide for tolling of parents' derivative actions and they did not timely comply with §46-72, their individual claims were barred. 104 H. 341, 90 P.3d 233 (2004).

Cited: 20 H. 165 (1910); 75 F. Supp. 553, 563 (1948); 198 F. Supp. 78, 91 (1961).