§480-24 Limitation of actions. (a) Any action to enforce a cause of action arising under this chapter shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and section 480-22. For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation.

(b) The following shall toll the time for commencement of actions by the State under this chapter if at any time:

(1) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, the person is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the terms respectively limited, after the return of the person into the State, and if, after the cause of action has accrued, the person departs from and resides out of the State, the time of the person's absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

(2) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, the person has petitioned for relief under the bankruptcy code, the time during which the bankruptcy case is pending shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

(3) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, there is a criminal action pending which arises out of the same occurrence, the time during which the criminal action is pending shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. As used in this paragraph, a criminal action is pending until its final adjudication in the trial court. L 1961, c 190, §22; Supp, §205A-22; HRS §480-24; am L 1989, c 230, §2

Case Notes

Relation back of counterclaim to date of complaint. 473 F. Supp. 1296.

Plaintiffs may recover for §480-2 violations which occurred prior to four-year statute of limitations if they can prove fraudulent concealment; series of fly-drive arrangements constituted alleged continuing violation; section did not bar claims for fly-drives occurring less than four years prior to filing of action. 491 F. Supp. 1199.

If State proved a continuing violation, it would be entitled to seek provable damages for the entire period of the continuing violation; this could include damages that might have occurred prior to the four years before suit was filed, if the continuing violation occurred during that period. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1180.

Plaintiff's claim under §480-2 failed, where the statute of limitations barred any unlawful business practice claim that occurred prior to the four-year limitation period and although the additional alleged occurrences would not be time-barred, plaintiff's asserted damages flowing from the violation were unrecoverable because they were speculative. 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272.

Fraudulent concealment may toll this section's statute of limitations. 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2011).

The court found it inappropriate to decide the date of accrual and the statute of limitations issue, as it was unclear from the speculative allegations in the amended complaint which specific acts, other than those addressed by the court's order, plaintiffs claimed to be unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 1 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2014).

Court found that plaintiffs', timeshare owners, alleged injuries arose from the implementation of defendants', timeshare resort operators, points-based program in 2010, which was allegedly a discrete act and not a continuing pattern and course of conduct. Therefore, court concluded that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply and that portions of plaintiffs' claims arising from their ability to use their floating interests in a weeks-based program were time-barred because plaintiffs filed their Complaint more than four years after the implementation of the points-based program. 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2016).

Plaintiffs, timeshare owners, argued that because neither Chapter 481A nor Chapter 514E had a specific statute of limitations, the six-year limitations period in §657-1 applied in their action against defendants, timeshare resort operators. However, the court found that the nature of plaintiffs' claim was a Chapter 480 unfair deceptive acts and practices claim and, therefore, the four-year limitation period of this section applied. 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2016).

Discussed: 792 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (2011); 907 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (2012).