Repealed.

(Dec. 10, 2009, D.C. Law 18-88, § 101, 56 DCR 7413; June 11, 2013, D.C. Law 19-317, § 213(a), 60 DCR 2064; June 16, 2015, D.C. Law 20-279, § 4, 62 DCR 1944.)

The 2013 amendment by D.C. Law 19-317 substituted “not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01” for “not more than $5,000” in (c)(1), and for “$10,000” in (c)(2).

For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 101 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-181, August 6, 2009, 56 DCR 6903).

For temporary (90 day) addition, see § 101 of Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2009 (D.C. Act 18-227, October 21, 2009, 56 DCR 8668).

For temporary (90 days) amendment of this section, see § 213(a) of the Criminal Fine Proportionality Emergency Act of 2013 (D.C. Act 20-45, April 1, 2013, 60 DCR 5400, 20 DCSTAT 1300).

For temporary (90 days) repeal of this section, see § 4(a) of the License to Carry a Pistol Second Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-564, Jan. 6, 2015, 62 DCR 866, 21 STAT 527).

For temporary (90 days) repeal of this section, see § 4(a) of the License to Carry a Pistol Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-447, Oct. 7, 2014, 61 DCR 10765, 20 STAT 4175).

For temporary (90 days) repeal of emergency D.C. Act 20-447, see § 4(b) of the License to Carry a Pistol Second Emergency Amendment Act of 2014 (D.C. Act 20-564, Jan. 6, 2015, 62 DCR 866, 21 STAT 527).

For temporary (90 days) repeal of this section, see § 4(a) of the License to Carry a Pistol Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2015 (D.C. Act 21-74, June 4, 2015, 62 DCR 8242, 21 DCSTAT 1451).

This section was held unconstitutional in Conley v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 633, — A.3d — (Sept. 26, 2013). In its analysis, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that D.C. Code § 22-2511 (2012) violates due process for two reasons. First, the essence of the offense is the defendant’s voluntary presence in a vehicle after he learns that it contains a firearm. Yet instead of requiring the government to prove that the defendant’s continued presence was voluntary, § 22-2511 requires the defendant to shoulder the burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that his presence in the vehicle was involuntary. This shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a critical component of the crime is incompatible with due process. But § 22-2511 offends due process in another way. It is incompatible with due process to convict a person of a crime based on the failure to take a legally required action — a crime of omission — if he had no reason to believe he had a legal duty to act, or even that his failure to act was blameworthy. The fundamental constitutional vice of § 22-2511 is that it criminalizes entirely innocent behavior — merely remaining in the vicinity of a firearm in a vehicle, which the average citizen would not suppose to be wrongful (let alone felonious) — without requiring the government to prove that the defendant had notice of any legal duty to behave otherwise. This is a defect that cannot be cured by interpreting the statutory language. Accordingly, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that § 22-2511 is unconstitutional on its face.

Applicability of D.C. Law 19-317: Section 401 of D.C. Law 19-317 provided that the act shall apply only to offenses committed on or after June 11, 2013.