In accordance with the provisions of section 51-14, the judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions of section 54-82c, the trial of such defendant shall commence within eight months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) of this section and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant's inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1) of this section.

(P.A. 82-349, S. 2, 4; P.A. 83-1, S. 2, 3; P.A. 07-217, S. 194.)

History: P.A. 82-349, S. 2, effective July 1, 1985; P.A. 83-1 made provisions applicable to person charged with criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985, effective March 24, 1983; P.A. 07-217 made technical changes, effective July 12, 2007.

Cited. 202 C. 443; 218 C. 85; 233 C. 813. Exception to 60-day limitation period for acts of God and misconduct on part of defendant is a necessary implication. 242 C. 389. Cited. 243 C. 115. Trial court properly determined that the time that co-defendant's attorney was unavailable was excludable time for computing the commencement of defendant's trial. 252 C. 714. Administrative incompetence, whether founded in negligence, recklessness or a serious dereliction of duty, does not constitute “exceptional circumstances”, and therefore “good cause”, for the failure to bring defendant to trial before the 30-day period has expired. 265 C. 437.

Cited. 14 CA 244; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 37 CA 384; 38 CA 868. Statutory right to speedy trial cited. 40 CA 483. Cited. Id., 643; Id., 757; 42 CA 144; 43 CA 488. Right to protection of statute waived by withdrawing motion and not filing for dismissal. 47 CA 91. Cited. 54 CA 361. Section codifies defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial and confers on Superior Court judges authority to make such rules as they deem necessary to establish procedure for implementing that right. 66 CA 357. Defendant not deprived of right to speedy trial when trial delay was occasioned by continuances requested by defendant's counsel, rather than by defendant, and defendant did not object. 78 CA 659.