(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm when he commits kidnapping in the second degree, as provided in section 53a-94, and in the commission of such offense he uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or uses or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, shotgun, rifle or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of kidnapping in the second degree and kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(P.A. 75-380, S. 10; P.A. 92-260, S. 37; P.A. 93-148, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from one year to three years the length of the nonsuspendable sentence.

Cited. 188 C. 697; 200 C. 523; 201 C. 115; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 110; 211 C. 672; 216 C. 282.

Cited. 9 CA 648; 46 CA 741. Although defendant did not physically restrain victim during her confinement, his threat against victim's life while armed with deadly weapon was evidence from which jury could reasonably infer that defendant possessed specific intent to prevent victim's liberation; defendant could not prevail on argument that section is unconstitutionally vague for failing to provide notice that any restraint of victim, even for a very brief time, could constitute the crime of kidnapping; case is not one of the rare cases where the restraint is so minimal or limited in time as to warrant a finding of unconstitutional vagueness. 133 CA 514.