(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person, or (3) commits sexual assault in the second degree as provided in section 53a-71 and in the commission of such offense is aided by two or more other persons actually present, or (4) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is mentally incapacitated to the extent that such other person is unable to consent to such sexual intercourse.

(b) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, sexual assault in the first degree is a class B felony for which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court or, if the victim of the offense is under ten years of age, for which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony if the offense is a violation of subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section and the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age or the offense is a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section. Any person found guilty under said subdivision (1) or (2) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which ten years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under ten years of age or of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under sixteen years of age.

(3) Any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least ten years, a portion of which may be suspended, except as provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, or a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of at least ten years. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of section 53a-29 and except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a court may suspend a portion of a sentence imposed under this subsection and impose a period of supervised probation pursuant to subsection (f) of section 53a-29.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 71; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 19; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 78; P.A. 75-619, S. 3; P.A. 82-428, S. 2; P.A. 89-359; P.A. 92-87, S. 3; P.A. 93-340, S. 14; P.A. 95-142, S. 13; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 49; P.A. 00-161, S. 1; P.A. 02-138, S. 5; P.A. 15-211, S. 16.)

History: 1971 act replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators in Subsec. (a) with numeric indicators; 1972 act changed applicable age in Subsec. (a)(1) from 21 to 18 reflecting lowered age of majority; P.A. 75-619 reworded section to reflect changes in definitions of Sec. 53a-65, substituted sexual “assault” for sexual “misconduct” and made the offense a Class B rather than Class D felony; P.A. 82-428 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that 1 year of sentence may not be suspended or reduced by the court; P.A. 89-359 added Subsec. (a)(2) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person under 13 years of age; P.A. 92-87 added Subsec. (a)(3) re committing sexual assault in the second degree while aided by two or more other persons actually present; P.A. 93-340 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to require that the actor be more than 2 years older than the other person; P.A. 95-142 amended Subsec. (b) to provide that 10 years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court if the victim is under 10 years of age; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase from 1 year to 2 years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence imposed when the victim is other than a victim under 10 years of age and to add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of at least 10 years; P.A. 00-161 added Subsec. (a)(4) re engaging in sexual intercourse with a person who is mentally incapacitated, which conduct was formerly classified as sexual assault in the second degree under Sec. 53a-71(a)(2) but was deleted from said section by same public act; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing provision re classification of offense and length of nonsuspendable sentence as Subdiv. (1) and amending said Subdiv. to add exception re Subdiv. (2), adding new Subdiv. (2) to classify the offense as a class A felony for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1) when the victim is under 16 years of age and for a violation of Subsec. (a)(2) and establish a nonsuspendable sentence for said violations of 10 years if the victim is under 10 years of age and 5 years if the victim is under 16 years of age and designating existing provisions re minimum length of a combined sentence of imprisonment and special parole as Subdiv. (3); P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (b)(3) to add provision re term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, a portion of which may be suspended, and exception and add provision re suspension of sentence and imposition of period of supervised probation.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

See Sec. 54-193a re statute of limitations for sexual abuse, exploitation or assault of minor.

Cited. 175 C. 315; Id., 398; 182 C. 412; 184 C. 258; 186 C. 45; Id., 449; Id., 521; 187 C. 216; 190 C. 20; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 154; 194 C. 114; Id., 297; Id., 692; 195 C. 253; 197 C. 280; Id., 298. Does not include sexual intercourse with a victim whom the assailant finds unconscious but does not apply when assailant strangled victim into a state of unconsciousness. 198 C. 53. Cited. Id., 190; 199 C. 121; Id., 193; Id., 281; Id., 481; Id., 693; 201 C. 115; Id., 659; 202 C. 343; Id., 676; 204 C. 98; Id., 441; Id., 571; 205 C. 61; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 733; 210 C. 110. Section not void for vagueness in context of circumstances of case. Id., 132. Cited. 211 C. 672; 212 C. 31; 215 C. 257. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. Id., 538. Cited. 219 C. 489; 220 C. 112; Id., 345; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 180; Id., 731; 224 C. 397; Id., 656; Id., 663; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 207; Id., 616; Id., 677; 228 C. 456; 230 C. 43; 235 C. 711; 238 C. 389; 240 C. 743; 242 C. 409; Id., 689. Penetration element of statute applicable to first degree sexual assault by fellatio not satisfied when alleged victim is compelled to lick perpetrator's penis without necessarily also being compelled to insert penis into the mouth. 256 C. 517.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 378; Id., 724; 3 CA 148; Id., 374; Id., 650; 5 CA 424; Id., 556; Id., 586; 7 CA 257; Id., 701; 8 CA 44; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 345; Id., 399; Id., 528; Id., 620; 10 CA 457; Id., 520; Id., 709. Court concluded the absence of a marital relationship between defendant and victim is not an essential element. 11 CA 102; Id., 112; Id., 236; Id., 238; Id., 316. Cited. 12 CA 585; 13 CA 413; 14 CA 333; Id., 688; 15 CA 251; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 391; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 111; 20 CA 737; 22 CA 531; Id., 562; 23 CA 1; Id., 221; Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 24 CA 13; Id., 24; Id., 295; 25 CA 334; Id., 503; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; 26 CA 151; Id., 433; Id., 674; 28 CA 548; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 642; 32 CA 773; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 754; 36 CA 177; 38 CA 56; Id., 777; 39 CA 267; 40 CA 553; 41 CA 604; 43 CA 715; 44 CA 548; 46 CA 741. Intent or motive of sexual assault perpetrators discussed. 47 CA 159. Age of victim not an element of crime for which jury makes a factual determination but a sentencing factor determined by the courts. 74 CA 376. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. Because the necessary elements of this section and Sec. 53-21 are distinct, court's respective findings of not guilty and guilty of these distinct crimes was not legally inconsistent. 78 CA 25. Trial court's finding that the state had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had committed sexual assault in the first degree and thereby violated his probation was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence. 108 CA 250. Sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense of sexual assault in the first degree; convictions under this section and Sec. 53a-73a do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because they are separate and distinct crimes and each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not. 171 CA 530.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 179 C. 328; 180 C. 101; Id., 565; 182 C. 449; 185 C. 163; Id., 402; 186 C. 757; 187 C. 681; 188 C. 372; Id., 565; Id., 574; Id., 697; 189 C. 106; Id., 611; Id., 631; 190 C. 104; Id., 327; Id., 440; Id., 496; 191 C. 604; 192 C. 166; 193 C. 457; 194 C. 258; Id., 594; Id., 692; 197 C. 50; Id., 485; 198 C. 53; Id., 190; Id., 285; Id., 314; Id., 405; Id., 430; Id., 598; Id., 617; 199 C. 62; Id., 399; Id., 481; 201 C. 559; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; 203 C. 385; 204 C. 714; 206 C. 39; Id., 132; Id., 437; Id., 528; 207 C. 646; 209 C. 143; Id., 416; 210 C. 51; Id., 110; Id., 315; Id., 359; 211 C. 18; 212 C. 31; 213 C. 593; 214 C. 38; Id., 717. Judgment of Appellate Court in 19 CA 111 reversed. 215 C. 538. Cited. 216 C. 563; 218 C. 447; 219 C. 269; Id., 283; Id., 489; 220 C. 400; Id., 487; Id., 698; 221 C. 264; 222 C. 87; 223 C. 52; 225 C. 450; Id., 519; 226 C. 601; Id., 618; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 393; Id., 456; Id., 552; Id., 582; Id., 756; 229 C. 529; Id., 557; Id., 580; 230 C. 43; 231 C. 195; 232 C. 707; 233 C. 403; 235 C. 145; Id., 502; Id., 659; 237 C. 284; Id., 576; Id., 694; 241 C. 784; Id., 823; 242 C. 409; Id., 445; Id., 523. Medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule applies to a child sexual assault victim's statements made to a social worker acting in the chain of medical care if statements were made to obtain medical treatment and were pertinent to the treatment sought. 260 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 344; Id., 724; 4 CA 514; Id., 672; 7 CA 149; Id., 489; Id., 653; 8 CA 35; Id., 148; Id., 177; Id., 387; Id., 528; Id., 620; 9 CA 208; Id., 340; 10 CA 217; Id., 709; 11 CA 102; Id., 316; Id., 673; 13 CA 60; Id., 67; Id., 76; 14 CA 40; Id., 451; Id., 657; Id., 688; Id., 710; 15 CA 222; 16 CA 75; 17 CA 525; 18 CA 134; Id., 273; Id., 643; Id., 730; 19 CA 111; judgment reversed, see 215 C. 538; Id., 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 101; Id., 193; Id., 737; 21 CA 411; Id., 467; 22 CA 329; Id., 477; 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 25 CA 243; Id., 384; Id., 653; judgment reversed, see 223 C. 52; Id., 725; 26 CA 81; Id., 395; Id., 433; Id., 574; 27 CA 279; Id., 705; 28 CA 91; Id., 195; Id., 360; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 529; Id., 402; Id., 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 29 CA 409; Id., 724; 30 CA 56; Id., 281; Id., 523; Id., 915; 32 CA 178; Id., 217; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 580; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; Id., 457; 34 CA 276; 35 CA 173; Id., 728; 36 CA 177; Id., 190; Id., 216; Id., 228; Id., 641; Id., 695; 38 CA 56; Id., 100; Id., 125; Id., 231; Id., 531; Id., 777; 39 CA 45; Id., 617; Id., 742; Id., 832; 40 CA 132; Id., 233; Id., 250; 41 CA 139; Id., 204; Id., 255; Id., 287; Id., 317; 42 CA 78; Id., 186; judgment reversed, see 241 C. 823; Id., 445; 43 CA 552; Id., 680; Id., 704; Id., 715; Id., 785; 44 CA 457; Id., 548; 45 CA 66; Id., 116; Id., 289; Id., 756; 46 CA 810. Conviction of both sexual assault and unlawful restraint is not double jeopardy. 47 CA 117. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in commenting on testimony of state's expert witness concerning inconsistencies in results of victim's rape kit tests, that court having also instructed jury to base findings on recollection of all evidence presented; defendant's challenge to other aspects of instructions on scientific evidence were not properly preserved for appellate review; trial court properly admitted victim's written statement to police as constancy of accusation evidence; defendant failed to establish that court abused its discretion or that he was prejudiced by admission of that evidence, and his claim that victim's statement is admissible only if tape recorded was incorrect. 48 CA 135. Subdiv. (1): Trier of fact reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant compelled victim to engage in sexual intercourse by use of force. 52 CA 466. Subdiv. (1): Defendant could not succeed in argument that the evidence did not support a guilty verdict under section; jury could reasonably have concluded that the facts and inferences established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 55 CA 412. Evidence was sufficient for jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 57 CA 736. Statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to facts of the case. 58 CA 585. Evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 75 CA 201. Subdiv. (1): Sexual assault in the second degree was not a lesser offense included within sexual assault in the first degree because it would be possible to commit the latter offense in the manner described in the information and bill of particulars without committing the former offense. 99 CA 251. Subdiv. (2) and Sec. 53-21(a)(2) are not the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes. 118 CA 180. Under Subdiv. (4), state need not show that any specific or identifiable drug or intoxicating substance had been administered to the victim without her consent, only that the victim was under the influence of some drug or intoxicating substance; criminal liability under Subdiv. (4) does not require a showing that the criminal actor administered the drug or intoxicating substance at issue or that the criminal actor knew, or had reason to know, that the victim was mentally incapacitated. 136 CA 731. Subdiv. (2): The age difference of more than 2 years between the complainant and the perpetrator of the sexual assault is an essential element; where the victim of the assault was 12 years old at the time of the assault and the state provided evidence that defendant was married and the father of a 3 year old child at the time and the jury had the opportunity to view defendant, the state presented sufficient evidence of defendant's age. 160 CA 61.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 207 C. 412, 416. Issue of whether victims were less than 10 years of age was a question for jury to decide during guilt phase of trial except in this case, where court decided issue of age in sentencing process, error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 271 C. 499. Under 2001 revision, as amended by P.A. 02-138, S. 5, Subdiv. (3) does not mandate that persons convicted of first degree sexual assault be sentenced to a period of imprisonment and special parole; it provides, rather, that if the court elects to impose such a sentence, the total combined period of imprisonment and special parole must total at least 10 years. 320 C. 239. Under 2005 revision, Subdiv. (3) requires only that any period of special parole that may be imposed shall, along with the accompanying term of imprisonment, constitute a total sentence of not less than 10 years. Id., 259.

Cited. 23 CA 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400.