(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to “affirmative” defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 581; 173 C. 254; Id., 317; Id., 360; 174 C. 16; Id., 142; 175 C. 398; 179 C. 1; 180 C. 481; 182 C. 207; Id., 430; Id., 595; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 157; 185 C. 163; Id., 199; 186 C. 261; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 383; 193 C. 70; Id., 602; 194 C. 233; Id., 241; Id., 408; 195 C. 611; 196 C. 36; Id., 567; 198 C. 124; 199 C. 14; Id., 155; Id., 591; 200 C. 30; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 289; Id., 605; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; Id., 520; 203 C. 445; Id., 484; 204 C. 630; 205 C. 61; Id., 616; 206 C. 213; 207 C. 1; 209 C. 34; 210 C. 519; Id., 652; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 695; Id., 716; 216 C. 585; Id., 647; 218 C. 747; 220 C. 384; Id., 765; 221 C. 109; 222 C. 117; Id., 718; 226 C. 497; 227 C. 301; 228 C. 384; Id., 393; 229 C. 125; 231 C. 235; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 397; Id., 40; Id., 469; Id., 502; Id., 748; 236 C. 266; 237 C. 501; Id., 518; Id., 748; 238 C. 389; 241 C. 1; Id., 413; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 389; Id., 648. In charge of attempt to commit sexual assault, conduct of a suspect who, for the purpose ultimately of having sex with a person whom the suspect believes to be a child, travels to a prearranged place to meet that child, is sufficient to constitute a substantial step in furtherance of the planned crime even if the person to be met is in fact an undercover officer and section is not unconstitutionally vague based on these facts. 277 C. 155.

Cited. 1 CA 344; 2 CA 333; 3 CA 166; 6 CA 24; 7 CA 1; Id., 257; Id., 367; Id., 503; Id., 701; 8 CA 351; Id., 496; Id., 545; Id., 631; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 587; 10 CA 130; Id., 503; 12 CA 32; Id., 163; Id., 217; Id., 395; Id., 604; Id., 685; 13 CA 69; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 38; Id., 284; 17 CA 359; 19 CA 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 326; Id., 386; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 449; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; 24 CA 13; Id., 624; Id., 697; 25 CA 104; Id., 298; Id., 334; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 725; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 601; 28 CA 34; Id., 64; Id., 469; 30 CA 26; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 370; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 34 CA 103; Id., 223; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 740; 36 CA 161; Id., 336; Id., 641; Id., 680; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; Id., 733; 38 CA 777; Id., 581; 39 CA 1; Id., 18; Id., 267; Id., 333; Id., 789; Id., 810; 40 CA 60; Id., 374; Id., 483; 41 CA 515; Id., 751; 42 CA 472; 43 CA 61; Id., 252; Id., 599; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 684; Id., 691; Id., 734. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251. To be guilty of attempt, defendant's conscious objective must be to cause result which would constitute the substantive crime. 107 CA 517. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of this section and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Sec. 53a-48 are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Threats, in connection with holding knife and advancing towards victim, are sufficient evidence for jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of assault in the first degree. 127 CA 1.

Cited. 33 CS 599; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 464; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 689; 182 C. 176; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 188 C. 574; 189 C. 303; 190 C. 822; 194 C. 258; 195 C. 651; 198 C. 53; 199 C. 255; 200 C. 44; Id., 607; 205 C. 528; Id., 673; 207 C. 646; 208 C. 202; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 211 C. 18; Id., 441; Id., 555; 212 C. 31; Id., 50; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243; 220 C. 408; Id., 652; Id., 928; 221 C. 402; Id., 915; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 234; 229 C. 60; Id., 839; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 322; Id., 802; 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. An instruction on Subdiv. (1) should be given when evidence indicates that perpetrator failed to accomplish or complete all elements of a particular crime solely because attendant circumstances were not as perpetrator believed them to be, rendering commission of the crime impossible, while an instruction under Subdiv. (2) should be given when perpetrator's conduct falls short of completed offense for reasons other than impossibility; under unique circumstances of case, where information was not specific to which part of attempt statute state was alleging, evidence presented did not clarify this omission, and trial court instructed jury only on Subdiv. (1), there was insufficient evidence to convict. 293 C. 234, but see 317 C. 292. Subdiv. (2): Because there were two separate and distinct transactions, defendant could be convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree without offending the prohibition on double jeopardy. 299 C. 640. Attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1) is not limited to situation where it is impossible for defendant to commit the crime, and applied where defendant admitted to assaulting victim with intent to kill her and believed that he had killed her; substantial step provision in Subdiv. (2) criminalizes certain conduct that would not violate attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1), and both provisions ensure elimination of the impossibility defense. 317 C. 292.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 6 CA 164; Id., 476; 7 CA 149; Id., 257; 10 CA 217; Id., 462; 11 CA 80; 12 CA 221; 13 CA 12; Id., 237; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; 15 CA 222; Id., 416; 23 CA 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; Id., 264; 26 CA 52; Id., 65; Id., 114; Id., 242; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 779; 28 CA 290; Id., 306; Id., 402; Id., 548; 29 CA 39; Id., 262; 30 CA 9; Id., 68; Id., 470; Id., 606; 31 CA 120; Id., 385; 33 CA 368; Id., 647; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 279; Id., 699; 36 CA 41; Id., 718; 38 CA 536; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 387; Id., 624; 41 CA 47; Id., 287; 42 CA 264; 43 CA 488; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 680; Id., 785; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 658; Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even though agent was not actually paid; to constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362. Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, defendant must be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111. Intent required for crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the officer from performing duties, regardless of whether injury is intended. 96 CA 634. Subdiv. (2): Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. “Circumstances as he believes them to be” language does not establish additional specific intent element necessitating proof that defendant believed one of his accomplices was armed with deadly weapon during attempted robbery. 184 CA 24.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 194 C. 258; 211 C. 555.

Court rejected defendant's argument that “following” must have a predatory thrust and requires proximity in space as well as in time; the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant followed the intended victim. 105 CA 335.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 221 C. 915.

Cited. 17 CA 128. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.