A mechanic's lien shall not continue in force for a longer period than one year after the lien has been perfected, unless the party claiming the lien commences an action to foreclose it, by complaint, cross-complaint or counterclaim, and records a notice of lis pendens in evidence thereof on the land records of the town in which the lien is recorded within one year from the date the lien was recorded or within sixty days of any final disposition of an application made pursuant to section 49-35a, including any appeal taken with respect thereto in accordance with section 49-35c, whichever is later. Each such lien, after the expiration of the one-year period or sixty-day period, as the case may be, without action commenced and notice thereof filed as aforesaid, shall be invalid and discharged as a matter of law. An action to foreclose a mechanic's lien shall be privileged in respect to assignment for trial. With respect to any such lien which was validated in accordance with the provisions of section 49-37a, the one-year period or sixty-day period, as the case may be, shall toll from the date of the validation.

(1949 Rev., S. 7223; February, 1965, P.A. 193; 1969, P.A. 732; P.A. 73-506; P.A. 74-128; P.A. 75-418, S. 3, 10; P.A. 76-290, S. 2, 6; P.A. 78-112; P.A. 79-602, S. 95; P.A. 16-194, S. 4.)

History: 1965 act limited mechanic's lien to four rather than two years, allowing two years for commencement of action and two years for final judgment where previously single two-year period encompassed both and added provision granting actions to foreclose mechanic's lien privileged status in assignment for trial; 1969 act required filing of lis pendens in evidence of commencement of action and allowed discharge of lien on request of property owner's attorney; P.A. 73-506 deleted provisions re two-year period for obtaining final judgment; P.A. 74-128 specified that lien is invalid and discharged as matter of law if two years elapses without commencement of action where previously lien was discharged by claimant upon request of property owner or his attorney; P.A. 75-418 reduced limit on lien from four years to one year, similarly requiring commencement of action within one year rather than two, and specified commencement of action by complaint, cross-complaint or counterclaim; P.A. 76-290 added provision re sixty-day period for commencement of action after disposition of appeals and specified that one-year or 60-day period tolls from date lien was validated; P.A. 78-112 required that notice of lis pendens be recorded on land records of town where lien recorded rather than filed with town clerk; P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but made no substantive changes; P.A. 16-194 replaced “final disposition of an appeal taken” with “final disposition of an application made pursuant to section 49-35a, including any appeal taken with respect thereto”.

See Sec. 52-192 re precedence in order of trial.

Necessity of serving cross complaint on all parties. 101 C. 664. Action must be commenced within 2-year limit; reaching this point by demurrer. Id., 665. Does not apply retroactively as amended in 1965. 161 C. 191. Cited. 164 C. 546. Time provisions of section are limitations on the right to enforce a lien and are not a statute of limitations which must be pleaded by defendant. 166 C. 255. Cited. 169 C. 76; 176 C. 409; 180 C. 501; 181 C. 592. Challenge by general contractor to constitutionality of mechanic's lien statutes discussed. 185 C. 583. Cited. 210 C. 175; 224 C. 563.

Cited. 10 CA 45; 26 CA 426; 31 CA 15; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 807.

Under statute prior to 1965 amendment, mechanic's lienor made a party defendant in action to foreclose a mortgage on liened property within 2 years of perfecting lien, held lienor need not institute his own action to foreclose but his claim was transferred to proceeds of first judicial sale. 20 CS 460. History discussed; action on lien must be commenced within 2 years, but reduction to final judgment is not limited to that period. 23 CS 329. Cited. Id., 380; 33 CS 552. Filing of lis pendens notice within 1 year is not condition precedent to right of foreclosure and does not go to jurisdiction of court; actual notice to defendant satisfies requirement; purpose is to avoid harshness of common law rule that every man deemed attentive to pending litigation. 34 CS 84. Cited. 42 CS 460.

Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 622.