Section 47a-43 - (Formerly Sec. 52-462). Complaint and procedure: Forcible entry and detainer; entry and detainer.

CT Gen Stat § 47a-43 (2019) (N/A)
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(a) When any person (1) makes forcible entry into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and with a strong hand detains the same, or (2) having made a peaceable entry, without the consent of the actual possessor, holds and detains the same with force and strong hand, or (3) enters into any land, tenement or dwelling unit and causes damage to the premises or damage to or removal of or detention of the personal property of the possessor, or (4) when the party put out of possession would be required to cause damage to the premises or commit a breach of the peace in order to regain possession, the party thus ejected, held out of possession, or suffering damage may exhibit his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court.

(b) Such judge shall forthwith issue a summons to the party complained of, directed to some proper officer, to notify him to appear at a specified time and place, within eight days from the exhibition of such complaint, in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the injury complained of was done, to answer to the matters contained in the complaint.

(c) Such summons shall be served upon the party complained of six days inclusive before the day appointed for trial.

(d) If, after service of such summons, the party complained of does not appear and defend, the judge shall proceed in the same manner as if he were present.

(1949 Rev., S. 8198; P.A. 76-95, S. 21, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; 76-436, S. 409, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 79-571, S. 38; P.A. 80-483, S. 126, 186.)

History: P.A. 76-95 applied provisions to cases of persons damaging premises or damaging or detaining personal property or cases where person out of possession would have to damage premises or commit breach of peace to regain possession; P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95; P.A. 76-436 removed provisions which had allowed complaints to judges of common pleas court and added reference to judicial districts, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; Sec. 52-462 transferred to Sec. 47a-43 in 1979; P.A. 79-571 divided section into Subsecs., added references to dwelling units and rephrased provisions; P.A. 80-483 made technical corrections.

Annotations to former section 52-462:

The remedy for a forcible entry and detainer was originally (1698) by proceedings instituted before a justice of the peace; in 1722, it was provided that they must be brought before two assistants, or an assistant and a justice of the peace, or two justices of the peace, one of whom must be of the quorum; and the complaint might be a qui tam one. 4 C. 92. Upon the abolition of the office of assistant, consequent on the adoption of the constitution of 1818, the court consisted of a judge of the county court and a justice of the peace, and, after the abolition of county courts in 1855, the place of the judge was supplied by a county commissioner; such court was held to be one of limited jurisdiction. 18 C. 100. By the revision of 1875, the proceedings were to be before a single judge; actual violence, used or threatened, is necessary to constitute a forcible entry or detainer. 23 C. 515. If some of the defendants are not served with the process, the others cannot object. 4 C. 93. Necessary averments. 17 C. 212; 18 C. 95; 99 C. 127; 100 C. 577. A mere agent cannot sustain a complaint. 23 C. 514. Under former statute, a writ of error lay to the Superior Court from the judgment of a county commissioner and a justice of the peace. 46 C. 468. Landlord has no right to regain possession by force when his tenant is holding over. 52 C. 16. Dispossession under void execution may constitute. 79 C. 682. Defendant cannot show title or right of possession in himself or a third person. 85 C. 206. Statute makes it unlawful for dispossessed owner to retake possession of his land by force. 99 C. 126. Plaintiff's cause of action based on possession; defendant's denial of plaintiff's possession does not put title in issue. 100 C. 577. Cited. 150 C. 346.

A showing of force or threat of force is required for relief under section. 10 CS 100; 13 CS 409; 17 CS 19. Distinguished from civil action under Sec. 52-465. 30 CS 607.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 190 C. 364; 196 C. 390; 203 C. 103; 209 C. 243; 221 C. 674. Public policy underlying statute is to prevent self-help on part of landlords seeking to recover possession of premises and to avoid costs of disturbances to public that can result therefrom; the legality of individual's presence as a tenant is not at issue under statute; nothing in statute protects a possessor from being removed from premises by police in accordance with criminal law for a breach of the peace. 284 C. 502.

Boat slip not deemed an appurtenance of the office. 5 CA 235. Cited. Id., 302; 17 CA 285; 24 CA 124; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 674; 45 CA 46; 46 CA 112. In order to prevail under section, plaintiff must show that he was in actual possession of premises at the time of defendant's action, and in this case trial court's finding of possession was overruled because complainant did not possess keys to premises and only accessed premises for short periods every other month. 62 CA 517. Purpose of statute is to prohibit property owner from entering his or her property in the act of taking possession thereof from one not legally entitled to such possession but who, nonetheless, maintains actual possession of such property. 71 CA 859. Cited. 87 CA 180. Section protects peaceable possession from disturbance, and the removal of plaintiff from the premises by police after plaintiff caused a disturbance and court's subsequent no contact order which effectively kept plaintiff off the premises did not form a proper basis for a finding of an entry and detainer. 121 CA 760. Section seeks to discourage owner resorting to self-help tactics so that peace and good order may be maintained. Id., 790. Defendant's act of entering premises without the consent of plaintiff pursuant to a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that plaintiff had vacated the premises did not violate the public policy that section seeks to uphold, and therefore did not constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. 133 CA 321.

Cited. 38 CS 1.