If an employee or, in case of his death, his dependent has a right to benefits or compensation under this chapter on account of injury or death from injury caused by the negligence or wrong of a fellow employee, such right shall be the exclusive remedy of such injured employee or dependent and no action may be brought against such fellow employee unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1. For purposes of this section, contractors' mobile equipment such as bulldozers, powershovels, rollers, graders or scrapers, farm machinery, cranes, diggers, forklifts, pumps, generators, air compressors, drills or other similar equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” if the claimed injury involving such equipment occurred at the worksite on or after October 1, 1983. No insurance policy or contract shall be accepted as proof of financial responsibility of the owner and as evidence of the insuring of such person for injury to or death of persons and damage to property by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles required by chapter 246 if it excludes from coverage under such policy or contract any agent, representative or employee of such owner from such policy or contract. Any provision of such an insurance policy or contract effected after July 1, 1969, which excludes from coverage thereunder any agent, representative or employee of the owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident with a fellow employee shall be null and void.

(1967, P.A. 842, S. 5; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 4; P.A. 83-297; P.A. 84-22, S. 1, 2.)

History: 1969 act clarified provisions re actions against fellow employees and added provisions re insurance policies and contracts; P.A. 83-297 provided that contractor's mobile equipment designed for use principally off public roads are not “motor vehicles” for purposes of this section if the injuries involving the equipment occur at the worksite; P.A. 84-22 made clear that the exclusions from the definition of “motor vehicle” established in P.A. 83-297 apply only to injuries which occur on or after October 1, 1983.

Cited. 167 C. 499; 169 C. 630. Fact that employer worked with plaintiff did not change his status to “fellow employee” to come within statute provisions. 178 C. 371. Employee has no right of action against fellow employee who directed operation of truck's hydraulic hoist since actions did not constitute “the operation of a motor vehicle”. 180 C. 469. Cited. 182 C. 24; 183 C. 508. Specific language of Sec. 4-165 prevails over general language of this statute as applied to fellow state employees. 185 C. 616. Section, which permits an action against a fellow employee for injuries arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, does not supersede the more specific provisions of Sec. 7-308. 187 C. 53. Term “operation of a motor vehicle” construed as not including activities unrelated to movement of the vehicle. 189 C. 354. Cited. Id., 550; 193 C. 59; 196 C. 91; 203 C. 34; 206 C. 495; 208 C. 589. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 215 C. 55. Cited. 220 C. 721; 221 C. 356; 222 C. 744; 237 C. 1; 242 C. 375. Tort actions for emotional injuries that are not compensable under act are not barred by exclusivity provisions of act. 259 C. 729. When read in conjunction with Sec. 31-275, statute plainly states that emotional distress not arising from physical injury is not compensable through workers' compensation. 265 C. 21. Trial court improperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because legislature did not intend to create a special hazard exception to the liability created under statute for injuries sustained by employee as a result of another employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle; discussion of legislative intent of statute; overruled 65 CA 771. 279 C. 177. Unicover insurance policy did not provide umbrella coverage. 285 C. 342.

Cited. 2 CA 174; 3 CA 40. Exception under statute is concerned only with those engaged in any activity related to driving or moving a vehicle or related to a circumstance resulting from the movement of a vehicle. Id., 246. Cited. 7 CA 296; Id., 575; 9 CA 290; 10 CA 18; Id., 618; 20 CA 619; 22 CA 88. Definition of “motor vehicle” for purposes of the exception in section is controlled by Sec. 14-1(a)(47) definition as further refined by Sec. 14-165(i). 30 CA 263. Cited. 41 CA 664. Golf cart not a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the “motor vehicle” exception to exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act. 54 CA 479. Statute does not authorize plaintiff's action against his employer arising out of a fellow employee's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 56 CA 325. Defendant's operation of a payloader to jump start plaintiff's dump truck did not constitute “operation of a motor vehicle” so as to bring the incident within the exception contained in section. 64 CA 409. Injuries caused by operation of external controls of garbage truck are not caused by operation of motor vehicle and do not fall within exception of exclusive remedy of worker's compensation. 99 CA 464. Container and chassis together constituted a trailer, and because the trailer was a vehicle suitable for transportation of property, was drawn by nonmuscular power, and was suitable for operation on a highway, it constituted a motor vehicle. 126 CA 860. A payloader is the same type of equipment as a bucket loader, as defined in Sec. 14-165, and not a motor vehicle under this section, therefore the motor vehicle exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act does not apply. 156 CA 727.

Cited. 30 CS 233; 36 CS 101; 39 CS 102; 40 CS 165. “Motor vehicle” exception discussed. 41 CS 326. Cited. 41 CS 391; 44 CS 148. Legislature did not treat or intend to treat golf carts differently from any other non-highway-type mechanism for purposes of section. 46 CS 24. Injury occurring from use of motor vehicle at service station did not fall under the motor vehicle exception but rather is attributable to “the special hazards of the work place”. 49 CS 351. Rules of statutory construction did not permit court to extend umbrella coverage based on facts of case. 50 CS 486.