Any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real property taxes, claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the board of tax review or the board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may, within two months from the date of the mailing of notice of such action, make application, in the nature of an appeal therefrom, with respect to the assessment list for the assessment year commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, October 1, 1991, October 1, 1992, October 1, 1993, October 1, 1994, or October 1, 1995, and with respect to the assessment list for assessment years thereafter, to the superior court for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated, which shall be accompanied by a citation to such town or city to appear before said court. Such citation shall be signed by the same authority and such appeal shall be returnable at the same time and served and returned in the same manner as is required in case of a summons in a civil action. The authority issuing the citation shall take from the applicant a bond or recognizance to such town or city, with surety, to prosecute the application to effect and to comply with and conform to the orders and decrees of the court in the premises. Any such application shall be a preferred case, to be heard, unless good cause appears to the contrary, at the first session, by the court or by a committee appointed by the court. The pendency of such application shall not suspend an action by such town or city to collect not more than seventy-five per cent of the tax so assessed or not more than ninety per cent of such tax with respect to any real property for which the assessed value is five hundred thousand dollars or more, and upon which such appeal is taken. If, during the pendency of such appeal, a new assessment year begins, the applicant may amend his application as to any matter therein, including an appeal for such new year, which is affected by the inception of such new year and such applicant need not appear before the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, to make such amendment effective. The court shall have power to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable, and, if the application appears to have been made without probable cause, may tax double or triple costs, as the case appears to demand; and, upon all such applications, costs may be taxed at the discretion of the court. If the assessment made by the board of tax review or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, is reduced by said court, the applicant shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court, or, at the applicant's option, shall be granted a tax credit for such overpayment, interest and any costs awarded by the court. Upon motion, said court shall, in event of such overpayment, enter judgment in favor of such applicant and against such city or town for the whole amount of such overpayment, less any lien recording fees incurred under sections 7-34a and 12-176, together with interest and any costs awarded by the court. The amount to which the assessment is so reduced shall be the assessed value of such property on the grand lists for succeeding years until the tax assessor finds that the value of the applicant's property has increased or decreased.

(P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 89-231, S. 4, 5; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; 90-266, S. 4, 6; P.A. 91-221, S. 4, 5; P.A. 92-254, S. 4, 6; P.A. 93-95, S. 4, 5; 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; 95-283, S. 17, 68; P.A. 96-1, S. 3–5; 96-261, S. 1, 3, 4; P.A. 13-276, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 90-266 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1990, effective June 8, 1990, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, and October 1, 1990; P.A. 91-221 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1991, effective June 10, 1991, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, and October 1, 1991; P.A. 92-254 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1992, effective June 3, 1992, and applicable to appeals from boards of tax review for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, October 1, 1990, October 1, 1991, and October 1, 1992; P.A. 93-95 extended applicability to assessment list for year commencing October 1, 1993, or October 1, 1994, effective June 2, 1993, and applicable to appeals from the board of tax review in any municipality for the assessment years commencing on October first in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994; P.A. 95-283 changed location of appeal from the judicial district in which the town or city is located to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain and changed the name of the board of tax review to the board of assessment appeals, effective October 1, 1996 (Revisor's note: P.A. 88-230, 90-98, 93-142 and 95-220 authorized substitution of “judicial district of Hartford” for “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain”, effective September 1, 1998). P.A. 96-1 repealed changes made by public act 95-283 and revised wording of previously existing law, effective March 6, 1996, and applicable to assessment years of municipalities commencing on or after October 1, 1995; P.A. 96-261 also repealed changes made by P.A. 95-283 and made technical change in previously existing law, effective June 10, 1996; P.A. 13-276 added provision re subtraction of lien recording fees from amount of judgment for overpayment of taxes.

Cited. 226 C. 407; 227 C. 826; 228 C. 23; 229 C. 618; 231 C. 731. To the extent that conditional approvals deprive taxpayers of immediate economic returns from their investment, such conditional approvals raise issues only of valuation, which properly may be addressed only by appeals under section. 232 C. 335. Cited. Id., 392; 236 C. 710; 240 C. 192; Id., 469; Id., 475; 241 C. 382; Id., 749. Bar to action must at any time use as its initial reference point the assessment date and not the date of the decennial revaluation. 242 C. 363. Judgment of Appellate Court in 41 CA 421 reversed. Id., 550. Cited. Id., 727. Subsequent title holder has no greater rights to challenge prior assessment than were possessed by its immediate assignor or by any prior assignee from the owner of a property at the time of assessment. 249 C. 1. Allegations of certain violations of public policy, such as a person's entering into an invalid contract or unauthorized practice of law, do not bar the person from a property tax appeal. 253 C. 255. Trial court rejected plaintiff's appeal of assessment for lack of credible evidence to establish aggrievement, and not because the going concern income capitalization approach to valuation is not permitted or recognized. 308 C. 87. Issue of city's wrongdoing is a proper consideration in property tax appeal pursuant to section; evidence of wrongdoing is not irrelevant as a matter of law as to the issue of an award of interest. 320 C. 332. Plaintiff property owner and taxpayer aggrieved by decision of the board of assessment appeals, but who was not a party to the proceedings before the board, has standing under section to bring an appeal to the trial court. Id., 535. Service of the appeal, rather than the filing of the application in court, must be completed within the two month limitation period. 324 C. 528, 544.

Cited. 31 CA 115; Id., 793; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 618; 35 CA 269; 38 CA 158; Id., 165; 40 CA 64; 41 CA 249; Id., 421; 42 CA 318; 43 CA 169; 44 CA 494; Id., 517; 46 CA 338. Assessor's method that treated plaintiff's properties as individual lots rather than one merged lot resulted in unfair treatment and a wrongful assessment, and therefore, plaintiff was aggrieved. 61 CA 834. Sec. 22a-45 does not limit property owner's remedy pursuant to this section. 80 CA 630. Plaintiff may not limit parameters of the court's valuation determination by challenging only one portion of the assessment because court determinations under section are de novo and court must arrive at its own conclusions by weighing all the evidence regardless of any alleged judicial admission as to scope of review; defendant town is not required to file a special defense under section; plaintiff who attempted to limit court's review to only one portion of an assessment was not deprived of due process when entire assessment was reviewed because Connecticut law has consistently held that trial court exercises de novo review. 84 CA 473. Statute allows taxpayer to challenge an illegal assessment outside prior statutorily mandated revaluation period and such appeal does not constitute impermissible request for interim revaluation. 85 CA 480. Section creates cause of action for taxpayer aggrieved by excessive and wrongful valuation of property, but there is no private right of action for taxpayer against municipal officials in individual capacities for alleged wrongdoing in tax assessment of property not owned or leased by or directly connected to taxpayer. 119 CA 453. Property owner must serve town with complaint and citation within 2 months of board's notice. 158 CA 565, 576; judgments affirmed, see 324 C. 528, 544.