(1) The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is not a defense unless the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

(2) When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707.

(3) Unless otherwise provided by this code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

(a) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

(b) It is given by a person who, by reason of immaturity, behavioral or mental health disorder, or intoxication, is manifestly unable and is known or reasonably should be known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

(c) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or

(d) It is induced by force, duress, or deception.

(4) Any defense authorized by this section is an affirmative defense.