As provided in the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, inspections may be ad hoc, routine, special, or a complementary access (or a combination of the foregoing). As provided in the Small Quantities Protocol of the U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement, inspections may be ad hoc or special. The objectives of the IAEA inspectors in the performance of inspections are as follows:

Ad hoc inspections to verify information contained in the licensee's, applicant's, certificate holder's, or possessor's of nuclear material outside facilities facility information or initial inventory report, or to identify and verify changes in the situation that have occurred after the inventory date under § 75.32(a) or (b) at any physical location where the initial inventory report or any inspections carried out indicate that nuclear material subject to safeguards pursuant to the Safeguards Agreements may be present;

Ad hoc inspections to identify and, if possible, verify the quantity and composition of the nuclear material referred to in notifications specified under § 75.43(b) (pertaining to exports) or § 75.43(c) (pertaining to imports) at any place where nuclear material may be located;

Routine inspections are conducted as specified by the facility attachments referred to in § 75.15 to verify nuclear material and as-built facility design at the strategic points and the records maintained under this part;

Special inspections may be conducted at any of the physical locations specified above and any additional places where the NRC (in coordination with other Federal agencies), in response to an IAEA request, finds access to be necessary;

Complementary access may be conducted at a location, using measures permitted under the Additional Protocol and as specified by managed access procedures, for the IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and accuracy of the information provided on DOC/NRC Form AP-1 or AP-A and associated forms; and

Complementary access must be provided at any additional locations where the Commission (in coordination with other Federal agencies), in response to an IAEA request, finds access to be necessary.

The NRC will notify the applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities of each such inspection or complementary access in writing as soon as possible after receiving the IAEA's notice from the U.S. Department of State. The applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities should consult with the NRC immediately if the inspection or complementary access would unduly interfere with its activities or if its key personnel cannot be available.

Each applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities subject to the provisions of this part shall recognize as a duly authorized representative of the IAEA any person bearing IAEA credentials for whom the NRC has provided written or electronic authorization that the IAEA representative is permitted to conduct inspection activities on specified dates. If the IAEA representative's credentials have not been confirmed by the NRC, the applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities shall not admit the person until the NRC has confirmed the person's credentials. The applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities shall notify the NRC promptly, by telephone, whenever an IAEA representative arrives at a facility, nuclear material outside facilities, or location without advance notification. The applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities shall also contact the NRC, by telephone, within 1 hour with respect to the credentials of any person who claims to be an IAEA representative and shall accept written or electronic confirmation of the credentials from the NRC. Confirmation may be requested through the NRC Operations Center (commercial telephone number 301-816-5100).

Each applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities subject to the provisions of this part shall allow the IAEA opportunity to conduct an NRC-approved inspection or complementary access of the facility, nuclear material outside facilities, or location to verify the information submitted under §§ 75.10 through 75.12 and 75.31 through 75.43. The NRC will assign an employee to accompany IAEA representative(s) at all times during the inspection or complementary access. The applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities may accompany IAEA representatives who inspect or access the facility, nuclear material outside facilities, or location. The IAEA representatives should not be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their duties.

Each applicant, licensee, or certificate holder shall permit the IAEA, in conducting an ad hoc, routine, or special inspection at a facility, to:

Examine records kept under § 75.21;

Observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accounting are representative;

Verify the function and calibration of instruments and other measurement control equipment;

Observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accounting are taken in accordance with procedures that produce representative samples, observe the treatment and analysis of the samples, and obtain duplicates of these samples;

Arrange to use the IAEA's own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance; and

Perform other measures requested by the IAEA and approved by the NRC.

Each applicant, licensee, or certificate holder shall, at the request of an IAEA inspector during an ad hoc, routine, or special inspection at a facility:

Ship material accountancy samples taken for the IAEA's use, in accordance with applicable packaging and export licensing regulations, by the method of carriage and to the address specified by the inspector; and

Take other actions contemplated by the Safeguards Agreement, and included in the safeguards approach approved by the United States and the IAEA, including but not limited to the following examples:

Enabling the IAEA to arrange to install its equipment for measurement and surveillance;

Enabling the IAEA to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containers;

Making additional measurements and taking additional samples for the IAEA's use;

Analyzing the IAEA's standard analytical samples;

Using appropriate standards in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and

Carrying out other calibrations.

Each applicant, licensee, or certificate holder shall permit the IAEA, in conducting complementary access at a location, under the provisions of the Additional Protocol and subsidiary arrangements, to:

Perform visual observations and record observations as photographs;

Conduct environmental sampling, when authorized by the U.S. Government;

Use radiation detection and measurement devices;

Apply seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices;

Perform nondestructive measurements and sampling;

Examine records relevant to quantities, origin, and disposition of materials to confirm the accuracy of the information provided under § 75.11;

Examine safeguards-relevant production and shipping records; and

Other objective measures that have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and the use of which has been agreed upon by the IAEA Board of Governors and following consultations between the IAEA and U.S. Government.

Each possessor of nuclear material outside facilities shall permit the IAEA, in conducting an ad hoc or special inspection for nuclear material outside facilities, to:

Observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points for material balance accounting are representative;

Verify the function and calibration of instruments and other measurement control equipment;

Observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accounting are taken in accordance with procedures that produce representative samples, observe the treatment and analysis of the samples, and obtain duplicates of these samples;

Arrange to use the IAEA's own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance; and

Perform other measures requested by the IAEA and approved by the NRC.

Each possessor of nuclear material outside facilities shall, at the request of an IAEA inspector during an ad hoc or special inspection for nuclear material outside facilities:

Ship material accountancy samples taken for the IAEA's use, in accordance with applicable packaging and export licensing regulations, by the method of carriage and to the address specified by the inspector; and

Take other actions contemplated by the U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement and included in the safeguards approach approved by the United States and the IAEA, including but not limited to the following examples:

Enabling the IAEA to arrange to install its equipment for measurement and surveillance;

Enabling the IAEA to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containers;

Making additional measurements and taking additional samples for the IAEA's use;

Analyzing the IAEA's standard analytical samples;

Using appropriate standards in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and

Carrying out other calibrations.

Nothing in this section requires or authorizes an applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material outside facilities to carry out any operation that would otherwise constitute a violation of the terms of any applicable license, regulation, or order of the NRC.