If the applicant seeks review of a major portion of a standard design, the application need only contain the information required by this section to the extent the requirements are applicable to the major portion of the standard design for which NRC staff approval is sought.

The application must contain a final safety analysis report that describes the facility, presents the design bases and the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components and of the facility, or major portion thereof, and must include the following information:

The site parameters postulated for the design, and an analysis and evaluation of the design in terms of those site parameters;

A description and analysis of the SSCs of the facility, with emphasis upon performance requirements, the bases, with technical justification, upon which the requirements have been established, and the evaluations required to show that safety functions will be accomplished. It is expected that the standard plant will reflect through its design, construction, and operation an extremely low probability for accidents that could result in the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission products. The description shall be sufficient to permit understanding of the system designs and their relationship to the safety evaluations. Items such as the reactor core, reactor coolant system, instrumentation and control systems, electrical systems, containment system, other engineered safety features, auxiliary and emergency systems, power conversion systems, radioactive waste handling systems, and fuel handling systems shall be discussed insofar as they are pertinent. The following power reactor design characteristics will be taken into consideration by the Commission:

Intended use of the reactor including the proposed maximum power level and the nature and inventory of contained radioactive materials;

The extent to which generally accepted engineering standards are applied to the design of the reactor;

The extent to which the reactor incorporates unique, unusual or enhanced safety features having a significant bearing on the probability or consequences of accidental release of radioactive materials; and

The safety features that are to be engineered into the facility and those barriers that must be breached as a result of an accident before a release of radioactive material to the environment can occur. Special attention must be directed to plant design features intended to mitigate the radiological consequences of accidents. In performing this assessment, an applicant shall assume a fission product release 9 from the core into the containment assuming that the facility is operated at the ultimate power level contemplated. The applicant shall perform an evaluation and analysis of the postulated fission product release, using the expected demonstrable containment leak rate and any fission product cleanup systems intended to mitigate the consequences of the accidents, together with applicable postulated site parameters, including site meteorology, to evaluate the offsite radiological consequences. The evaluation must determine that:

9 The fission product release assumed for this evaluation should be based upon a major accident, hypothesized for purposes of site analysis or postulated from considerations of possible accidental events. These accidents have generally been assumed to result in substantial meltdown of the core with subsequent release into the containment of appreciable quantities of fission products.

An individual located at any point on the boundary of the exclusion area for any 2-hour period following the onset of the postulated fission product release, would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem 10 total effective dose equivalent (TEDE); and

10 A whole body dose of 25 rem has been stated to correspond numerically to the once in a lifetime accidental or emergency dose for radiation workers which, according to NCRP recommendations at the time could be disregarded in the determination of their radiation exposure status (see NBS Handbook 69 dated June 5, 1959). However, its use is not intended to imply that this number constitutes an acceptable limit for an emergency dose to the public under accident conditions. Rather, this dose value has been set forth in this section as a reference value, which can be used in the evaluation of plant design features with respect to postulated reactor accidents, to assure that these designs provide assurance of low risk of public exposure to radiation, in the event of an accident.

An individual located at any point on the outer boundary of the low population zone, who is exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem TEDE;

The design of the facility including:

The principal design criteria for the facility. Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50, general design criteria (GDC), establishes minimum requirements for the principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants similar in design and location to plants for which construction permits have previously been issued by the Commission and provides guidance to applicants in establishing principal design criteria for other types of nuclear power units;

The design bases and the relation of the design bases to the principal design criteria; and

Information relative to materials of construction, general arrangement, and approximate dimensions, sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the design will conform to the design bases with adequate margin for safety;

An analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of SSC with the objective of assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility and including determination of the margins of safety during normal operations and transient conditions anticipated during the life of the facility, and the adequacy of SSCs provided for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of the consequences of accidents. Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance and the need for high-point vents following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and 50.46a;

The kinds and quantities of radioactive materials expected to be produced in the operation and the means for controlling and limiting radioactive effluents and radiation exposures within the limits set forth in part 20 of this chapter;

The information required by § 20.1406 of this chapter;

The technical qualifications of the applicant to engage in the proposed activities in accordance with the regulations in this chapter;

The information necessary to demonstrate compliance with any technically relevant portions of the Three Mile Island requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50.34(f), except paragraphs (f)(1)(xii), (f)(2)(ix), and (f)(3)(v) of 10 CFR 50.34(f);

For applications for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants, an evaluation of the standard plant design against the Standard Review Plan (SRP) revision in effect 6 months before the docket date of the application. The evaluation required by this section shall include an identification and description of all differences in design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for the design and those corresponding features, techniques, and measures given in the SRP acceptance criteria. Where a difference exists, the evaluation shall discuss how the proposed alternative provides an acceptable method of complying with the Commission's regulations, or portions thereof, that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria. The SRP is not a substitute for the regulations, and compliance is not a requirement;

The information with respect to the design of equipment to maintain control over radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents produced during normal reactor operations described in 10 CFR 50.34a(e);

The information pertaining to design features that affect plans for coping with emergencies in the operation of the reactor facility or a major portion thereof;

An analysis and description of the equipment and systems for combustible gas control as required by § 50.44 of this chapter;

The list of electric equipment important to safety that is required by 10 CFR 50.49(d);

A description of protection provided against pressurized thermal shock events, including projected values of the reference temperature for reactor vessel beltline materials as defined in 10 CFR 50.60 and 50.61;

Information demonstrating how the applicant will comply with requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events in § 50.62;

The coping analysis, and any design features necessary to address station blackout, as described in § 50.63 of this chapter;

Information demonstrating how the applicant will comply with requirements for criticality accidents in § 50.68(b)(2)-(b)(4);

A description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the standard plant necessary to comply with part 50, appendix A, GDC 3, and § 50.48 of this chapter;

A description of the quality assurance program applied to the design of the SSCs of the facility. Appendix B to 10 CFR part 50, “Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs for nuclear power plants. The description of the quality assurance program for a nuclear power plant shall include a discussion of how the applicable requirements of appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 were satisfied;

The information necessary to demonstrate that the standard plant complies with the earthquake engineering criteria in 10 CFR part 50, appendix S;

Proposed technical resolutions of those Unresolved Safety Issues and medium- and high-priority generic safety issues which are identified in the version of NUREG-0933 current on the date up to 6 months before the docket date of the application and which are technically relevant to the design;

The information necessary to demonstrate how operating experience insights have been incorporated into the plant design;

For light-water reactor designs, a description and analysis of design features for the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents, e.g., challenges to containment integrity caused by core-concrete interaction, steam explosion, high-pressure core melt ejection, hydrogen combustion, and containment bypass;

A description, analysis, and evaluation of the interfaces between the standard design and the balance of the nuclear power plant; and

A description of the design-specific probabilistic risk assessment and its results.

For applications for standard design approvals which are subject to 10 CFR 50.150(a), the information required by 10 CFR 50.150(b).

An application for approval of a standard design, which differs significantly from the light-water reactor designs of plants that have been licensed and in commercial operation before April 18, 1989, or uses simplified, inherent, passive, or other innovative means to accomplish its safety functions, must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.43(e).