Reportable events. (1) The holder of an operating license under this part or a combined license under part 52 of this chapter (after the Commission has made the finding under § 52.103(g) of this chapter) for a nuclear power plant (licensee) shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. In the case of an invalid actuation reported under § 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. Unless otherwise specified in this section, the licensee shall report an event if it occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery regardless of the plant mode or power level, and regardless of the significance of the structure, system, or component that initiated the event.

The licensee shall report:

The completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.

Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications except when:

The Technical Specification is administrative in nature;

The event consisted solely of a case of a late surveillance test where the oversight was corrected, the test was performed, and the equipment was found to be capable of performing its specified safety functions; or

The Technical Specification was revised prior to discovery of the event such that the operation or condition was no longer prohibited at the time of discovery of the event.

Any deviation from the plant's Technical Specifications authorized pursuant to § 50.54(x) of this part.

Any event or condition that resulted in:

The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or

The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

Any natural phenomenon or other external condition that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.

Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section, except when:

The actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation; or

The actuation was invalid and;

Occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or

Occurred after the safety function had been already completed.

The systems to which the requirements of paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(A) of this section apply are:

Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip.

General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

Emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) including: high-head, intermediate-head, and low-head injection systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay) heat removal systems.

ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.

BWR reactor core isolation cooling system; isolation condenser system; and feedwater coolant injection system.

PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system.

Containment heat removal and depressurization systems, including containment spray and fan cooler systems.

Emergency ac electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs); hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station; and BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs.

Emergency service water systems that do not normally run and that serve as ultimate heat sinks.

Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition;

Remove residual heat;

Control the release of radioactive material; or

Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies. However, individual component failures need not be reported pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(v) of this section if redundant equipment in the same system was operable and available to perform the required safety function.

Any event where a single cause or condition caused at least one independent train or channel to become inoperable in multiple systems or two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to:

Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition;

Remove residual heat;

Control the release of radioactive material; or

Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Any airborne radioactive release that, when averaged over a time period of 1 hour, resulted in airborne radionuclide concentrations in an unrestricted area that exceeded 20 times the applicable concentration limits specified in appendix B to part 20, table 2, column 1.

Any liquid effluent release that, when averaged over a time period of 1 hour, exceeds 20 times the applicable concentrations specified in appendix B to part 20, table 2, column 2, at the point of entry into the receiving waters (i.e., unrestricted area) for all radionuclides except tritium and dissolved noble gases.

Any event or condition that as a result of a single cause could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or channels in different systems that are needed to:

Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition;

Remove residual heat;

Control the release of radioactive material; or

Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Events covered in paragraph (a)(2)(ix)(A) of this section may include cases of procedural error, equipment failure, and/or discovery of a design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacy. However, licensees are not required to report an event pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ix)(A) of this section if the event results from:

A shared dependency among trains or channels that is a natural or expected consequence of the approved plant design; or

Normal and expected wear or degradation.

Any event that posed an actual threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant or significantly hampered site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant including fires, toxic gas releases, or radioactive releases.

Contents. The Licensee Event Report shall contain:

A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all component or system failures that contributed to the event and significant corrective action taken or planned to prevent recurrence.

A clear, specific, narrative description of what occurred so that knowledgeable readers conversant with the design of commercial nuclear power plants, but not familiar with the details of a particular plant, can understand the complete event.

The narrative description must include the following specific information as appropriate for the particular event:

Plant operating conditions before the event.

Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event.

Dates and approximate times of occurrences.

The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known.

The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known.

The Energy Industry Identification System component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to in the LER.

The Energy Industry Identification System is defined in: IEEE Std 803-1983 (May 16, 1983) Recommended Practice for Unique Identification in Power Plants and Related Facilities—Principles and Definitions.

IEEE Std 803-1983 has been approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

A notice of any changes made to the material incorporated by reference will be published in the Federal Register. Copies may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331. IEEE Std 803-1983 is available for inspection at the NRC's Technical Library, which is located in the Two White Flint North Building, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

For failures of components with multiple functions, include a list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected.

For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, an estimate of the elapsed time from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service.

The method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error.

For each human performance related root cause, the licensee shall discuss the cause(s) and circumstances.

Automatically and manually initiated safety system responses.

The manufacturer and model number (or other identification) of each component that failed during the event.

An assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the event. This assessment must include:

The availability of systems or components that could have performed the same function as the components and systems that failed during the event, and

For events that occurred when the reactor was shutdown, the availability of systems or components that are needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

A description of any corrective actions planned as a result of the event, including those to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future.

Reference to any previous similar events at the same plant that are known to the licensee.

The name and telephone number of a person within the licensee's organization who is knowledgeable about the event and can provide additional information concerning the event and the plant's characteristics.

Supplemental information. The Commission may require the licensee to submit specific additional information beyond that required by paragraph (b) of this section if the Commission finds that supplemental material is necessary for complete understanding of an unusually complex or significant event. These requests for supplemental information will be made in writing and the licensee shall submit, as specified in § 50.4, the requested information as a supplement to the initial LER.

Submission of reports. Licensee Event Reports must be prepared on Form NRC 366 and submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as specified in § 50.4.

Report legibility. The reports and copies that licensees are required to submit to the Commission under the provisions of this section must be of sufficient quality to permit legible reproduction and micrographic processing.

[Reserved]

Reportable occurrences. The requirements contained in this section replace all existing requirements for licensees to report “Reportable Occurrences” as defined in individual plant Technical Specifications.