A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, such person commits or attempts to commit robbery, home invasion, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, such person, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants, except that in any prosecution under this section, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant: (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (2) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any dangerous instrument; and (3) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon or instrument; and (4) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(P.A. 74-186, S. 11, 12; P.A. 76-336, S. 21; P.A. 79-570, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 28; P.A. 15-211, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 76-336 replaced rape in first degree, deviate sexual intercourse in first degree and sexual contact in first degree with sexual assault in first degree, sexual assault in first degree with firearm, sexual assault in third degree and sexual assault in third degree with firearm; P.A. 79-570 removed murder resulting from commission of or attempt to commit arson from purview of section; P.A. 92-260 replaced obsolete reference to offense of “sexual assault in the first degree with a firearm” with revised name of “aggravated sexual assault in the first degree”; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the indicators (A), (B), (C) and (D) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively for consistency with statutory usage); P.A. 15-211 added “home invasion,” and made technical changes.
See Sec. 53a-54a re murder.
See Sec. 53a-54b re capital felony.
Cited. 171 C. 683; 176 C. 257; 177 C. 677; 178 C. 116; 179 C. 78. Court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery since element of causation, which differentiates felony murder from the lesser offenses, was not sufficiently in dispute. 180 C. 599. Cited. 181 C. 151; Id., 187; 182 C. 419; Id., 580; 183 C. 299; 186 C. 1; 188 C. 542; 189 C. 346; 191 C. 636; Id., 659; 193 C. 70; Id., 144; Id., 350; 194 C. 223; Id., 279; Id., 416; Id., 530; 195 C. 505. Manslaughter is not a lesser included crime otherwise of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 197 C. 396; Id., 436; Id., 588; 198 C. 92; Id., 255; Id., 386; Id., 397; Id., 435; Id., 506; Id., 517; Id., 638; Id., 644; 199 C. 110; 200 C. 323; Id., 721; 201 C. 34; Id., 395; Id., 462; 202 C. 18; Id., 39; 203 C. 4; Id., 212; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 298; Id., 485; Id., 507; Id., 616; Id., 638; 206 C. 157; Id., 657; 207 C. 1; 208 C. 52; 209 C. 34; Id., 75; Id., 290; Id., 564; Id., 636; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; Id., 751; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 387; 213 C. 388; 214 C. 132; Id., 454; Id., 493; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; Id., 699; 218 C. 85; Id., 151; Id., 309; Id., 447; Id., 486; 219 C. 743; 220 C. 1; Id., 385; Id., 417; 221 C. 315; Id., 635; Id., 643; Id., 685; 222 C. 117; 223 C. 299; Id., 595; Id., 635; Id., 834; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 101; 229 C. 691; 230 C. 88; Id., 183; Id., 351; 233 C. 44; 234 C. 97; 235 C. 595; Id., 748; Id., 802; 237 C. 390; Id., 518; Id., 694; 238 C. 389; Id., 828; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 322. Conviction for felony murder under this section cannot serve as predicate for the crime of capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(1). Id., 702. Cited. 242 C. 93; Id., 125; Id., 409; Id., 666; 247 C. 662. It is inconsistent with purpose of statute to allow defendant who causes a death in the course of a felony to claim self-defense because victim attempted to thwart the felony. 254 C. 184. The defense of self-defense does not apply to charge of felony murder as a matter of law. Id., 202. A proper charge on felony murder predicated on an attempt crime should include an instruction on the definition of criminal attempt. 286 C. 707. Conviction of felony murder and robbery in first degree under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) does not constitute double jeopardy. 302 C. 287. Defendant could be found guilty of felony murder if found guilty of the underlying felony robbery charge regardless of whether defendant was found guilty of the robbery charge as a principal, accessory or on the basis of vicarious liability under the Pinkerton doctrine. 303 C. 378. Felony murder is a class A felony subject to the penalties in Sec. 53a-35a(2). 308 C. 263.
Cited. 11 CA 80; 12 CA 385; 24 CA 723; 27 CA 794; 29 CA 573; Id., 771; 30 CA 381; 31 CA 771; judgment reversed, see 230 C. 88; 32 CA 38; Id., 431; 33 CA 90; 35 CA 762; 36 CA 364; Id., 506; Id., 556; 38 CA 581; 41 CA 515. Self-defense not available as a defense to charge of felony murder. 42 CA 348. Cited. Id., 472; 43 CA 61; 45 CA 32; Id., 187; Id., 390; Id., 658. Reaffirmed prior holding that self-defense not a valid defense to charge of felony murder. 51 CA 798. Court rejects defendant's argument that killing of victim who resisted a robbery attempt by walking away is not committed “in the course of and in furtherance of” the attempted robbery because the attempted robbery had ceased. 64 CA 596. Felony murder conviction carries mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years imprisonment. 127 CA 718. Homicide and assault were committed “in furtherance of” conspiracy to commit robbery, because it was within defendant's contemplation that one or more of the people she intended to rob at gunpoint would be shot and injured or killed. Id., 819. Conviction of murder under Sec. 53a-54a and felony murder under this section for same offense violated prohibition against double jeopardy. 153 CA 691. Legislature intended multiple punishments for felony murder and the underlying predicate offenses; conviction for kidnapping under Sec. 53a-92(a)(2) and robbery under Sec. 53a-134(a)(1) do not violate double jeopardy even though they are the predicate offenses for felony murder conviction. 180 CA 371.
Cited. 36 CS 141; 41 CS 385; 42 CS 426.