(a) In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.

(b) The phrase “railroad company” shall be construed to mean and include all corporations, trustees, receivers or other persons, that lay out, construct, maintain or operate a railroad, unless such meaning would be repugnant to the context or to the manifest intention of the General Assembly.

(c) The term “banks” shall include all incorporated banks.

(d) The term “savings banks” shall include savings banks, societies for savings and savings societies.

(e) The term “public buildings” shall include a statehouse, courthouse, townhouse, arsenal, magazine, prison, community correctional center, almshouse, market or other building belonging to the state, or to any town, city or borough in the state, and any church, chapel, meetinghouse or other building generally used for religious worship, and any college, academy, schoolhouse or other building generally used for literary instruction.

(f) Words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, and words importing the plural number may include the singular.

(g) Words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females and words importing the feminine gender may be applied to males.

(h) Words purporting to give a joint authority to several persons shall be construed as giving authority to a majority of them.

(i) The word “month” means a calendar month, and the word “year” means a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed.

(j) The word “oath” shall include affirmations in cases where by law an affirmation may be used for an oath, and, in like cases, the word “swear” shall include the word “affirm”.

(k) The words “person” and “another” may extend and be applied to communities, companies, corporations, public or private, limited liability companies, societies and associations.

(l) The words “preceding”, “following” and “succeeding”, when used by way of reference to any section or sections, mean the section or sections next preceding, next following or next succeeding, unless some other section is expressly designated in such reference.

(m) Except as provided in section 7-452, “legislative body” means: (1) As applied to unconsolidated towns, the town meeting; (2) as applied to cities and consolidated towns and cities, the board of aldermen, council or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations; (3) as applied to boroughs and consolidated towns and boroughs, the board of burgesses; and (4) as applied to all other districts and associations, the district committee or association committee or other body charged with the duty of making annual appropriations.

(n) “Ordinance” means an enactment under the provisions of section 7-157.

(o) “Voters” means those persons qualified to vote under the provisions of section 7-6.

(p) Repealed by P.A. 76-186.

(q) Except as otherwise specifically defined, the words “agriculture” and “farming” shall include cultivation of the soil, dairying, forestry, raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural commodity, including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training and management of livestock, including horses, bees, poultry, fur-bearing animals and wildlife, and the raising or harvesting of oysters, clams, mussels, other molluscan shellfish or fish; the operation, management, conservation, improvement or maintenance of a farm and its buildings, tools and equipment, or salvaging timber or cleared land of brush or other debris left by a storm, as an incident to such farming operations; the production or harvesting of maple syrup or maple sugar, or any agricultural commodity, including lumber, as an incident to ordinary farming operations or the harvesting of mushrooms, the hatching of poultry, or the construction, operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways used exclusively for farming purposes; handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freezing, grading, storing or delivering to storage or to market, or to a carrier for transportation to market, or for direct sale any agricultural or horticultural commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations, or, in the case of fruits and vegetables, as an incident to the preparation of such fruits or vegetables for market or for direct sale. The term “farm” includes farm buildings, and accessory buildings thereto, nurseries, orchards, ranges, greenhouses, hoophouses and other temporary structures or other structures used primarily for the raising and, as an incident to ordinary farming operations, the sale of agricultural or horticultural commodities. The term “aquaculture” means the farming of the waters of the state and tidal wetlands and the production of protein food, including fish, oysters, clams, mussels and other molluscan shellfish, on leased, franchised and public underwater farm lands. Nothing herein shall restrict the power of a local zoning authority under chapter 124.

(r) Definition of felony and misdemeanor repealed by 1969, P.A. 828, S. 214.

(s) When a statute repealing another is afterwards repealed, the first shall not be revived without express words to that effect.

(t) The repeal of an act shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, or prosecution, or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal, for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred under the act repealed.

(u) The passage or repeal of an act shall not affect any action then pending.

(v) All provisions of the statutes relating to annual town meetings or elections shall be applicable to biennial meetings or elections unless a contrary intent appears.

(w) “Correctional institution”, “state prison”, “community correctional center” or “jail” means a correctional facility administered by the Commissioner of Correction.

(x) Whenever a title which denotes gender is applied to an individual the title shall suit the gender of the individual.

(y) “Deposit account” includes a share account of a savings and loan association.

(z) If a statute refers to another statute of this state, the reference includes any amendments to the referenced statute unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed.

(1949 Rev., S. 3639, 8873, 8890; 1955, S. 1700d, 1701d; 1957, P.A. 13, S. 1; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 78; 152, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 130, S. 1; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 152, S. 9, 10; 1969, P.A. 297; 828, S. 214; 1971, P.A. 154, S. 1; P.A. 73-436; P.A. 74-127; P.A. 75-366; P.A. 76-186; P.A. 78-121, S. 87, 113; P.A. 81-269; P.A. 86-186, S. 1; P.A. 87-282, S. 1; P.A. 90-24; P.A. 92-26; P.A. 95-79, S. 1, 189; P.A. 96-77, S. 15, 17; P.A. 01-20, S. 1; P.A. 09-57, S. 2; P.A. 14-122, S. 61, 62.)

History: 1959 acts repealed definition of municipal courts and eliminated “county” from the definition of public buildings; 1961 act added definitions of “penal institutions” and “correctional institutions”; 1963 act eliminated “work house” from the definition of public buildings; 1967 act redefined “penal institutions” and “correctional institutions”; 1969 P.A. 297 redefined “correctional institutions” and P.A. 828 repealed the definition of “felonies” and “misdemeanors,” effective October 1, 1971; 1971 act redefined “correction institutions”; P.A. 73-436 added Subsec. (x); P.A. 74-127 amended Subsec. (g) to provide that words which imply feminine gender also apply to males; P.A. 75-366 expanded and clarified the definitions of “agriculture” and “farming”; P.A. 76-186 repealed Subsec. (p) defining “page”; P.A. 78-121 added definition of “deposit account”; P.A. 81-269 amended Subsec. (q) by expanding the definition of agriculture to include the raising or harvesting of shellfish and by defining aquaculture; P.A. 86-186 amended Subsec. (w) to reflect restructuring of Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield as Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Medium, and Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum, to add the Connecticut Correctional Center, Cheshire and to change the name of the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Cheshire to the John R. Manson Youth Institution, Cheshire; P.A. 87-282 amended Subsec. (w) to change the name of the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Enfield-Minimum to the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution, Enfield; P.A. 90-24 redefined “correctional institutions” in Subsec. (w) by deleting reference to “Connecticut Correctional Camp, Portland” and by adding reference to the Eddy/DWI Correctional Unit, Middletown; the Hartell/DWI Correctional Unit, Windsor Locks; the J.B. Gates Correctional Unit, Niantic; the Jennings Road Detention Center, Hartford; the Morgan Street Detention Center, Hartford; the Union Avenue Detention Center, New Haven; the Western Substance Abuse Treatment Unit, Newtown, and made certain other technical changes; P.A. 92-26 redefined “agriculture” and “aquaculture” to include the raising or harvesting of fish and expanded the definition of “farm” to include hoophouses and other temporary structures; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” and “another” to include limited liability companies, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 96-77 amended Subsec. (k) to reposition “limited liability companies”; P.A. 01-20 amended Subsec. (w) to replace provisions defining “correctional institutions” and listing by name the correctional institutions, youth institutions, correctional centers, community correctional centers, detention centers, correctional units and substance abuse treatment units included within that definition and provisions construing “State Prison”, “State Prison for Women”, “jail” or “jails”, “Connecticut Reformatory” and “The Connecticut State Farm for Women” with provision that “correctional institution”, “state prison”, “community correctional center” or “jail” means a correctional facility administered by the Commissioner of Correction; P.A. 09-57 added Subsec. (z) re construction of statutory references, effective May 20, 2009; P.A. 14-122 made technical changes in Subsecs. (i) and (l) to (o).

Section does not limit power of the legislature. 81 C. 213. If the intent is clear, there is no room for construction. 75 C. 69; Id., 608; 81 C. 598; 86 C. 425; 89 C. 196; 100 C. 322; 125 C. 210; 155 C. 502; 156 C. 276. A statute must be construed to carry out intent of the legislature and when language is doubtful meaning is ascertained by all its provisions, object of passage, title, preexisting legislation on the subject and other relevant circumstances. 72 C. 148; 89 C. 196; Id., 293; 100 C. 322; 154 C. 162. Meaning of statute enacted in 1672 must be that of legal language then and since Connecticut never adopted the common law such meaning was to be found in orders of the General Court and the word of God, then the law of the land. 72 C. 148. Change in language of a statute shows intent to change the law. 144 C. 241. When two statutes appear to be repugnant, it is duty of court to construe them so that both are operative if that is reasonably possible. 145 C. 53. Interpretation of statute by commissioner who must enforce it is entitled to great weight. Id., 490. Courts must apply statutes as they find them, whether or not they think that statutes might be improved by inclusion of other or additional provisions. 148 C. 33. Construction of statute depends upon its expressed intent when it is taken as a whole. Id., 87. When court may consider legislative history of statute as an aid in interpreting such statute. Id., 341. Legislative intent is not to be found in isolated sentence but enactment must be examined in its entirety and its parts reconciled and made operative so far as possible. Id., 376. Statutes should be construed retrospectively only when mandate of legislature is imperative. Id., 447. Cited. Id., 481. Courts must assume that legislature intended a reasonable and rational result and must, when possible, construe statutes accordingly. Id., 551. Cited. 149 C. 248. A penal statute is to be strictly construed. 101 U.S. 188; 67 C. 286; 79 C. 338; 82 C. 1; Id., 539; 83 C. 300; 84 C. 47; 85 C. 23; Id., 481; 87 C. 253; 112 C. 39; 121 C. 160. However, technicality does not avoid intent. 146 C. 605. What constitutes a penal statute. 74 C. 132; 86 C. 191; 87 C. 253; Id., 461. Statutory remedy of double or treble damages penal in nature. 84 C. 47. Statute in derogation of private rights should be strictly construed. 68 C. 113; 74 C. 321; 75 C. 423; 143 C. 358. Constitutional provisions or statutes in derogation of common law to be treated in same manner. 79 C. 163; 81 C. 632. Franchise in derogation of public rights to be treated in same manner. 71 C. 657; 87 C. 183. Statute enacting settled public policy of charitable tax exemptions to be construed reasonably. 71 C. 316. Cited. 162 C. 102, 406; 165 C. 396; Id., 466; Id., 559; 166 C. 642; 167 C. 499. Commonly approved meaning of “security” taken from dictionaries. 168 C. 112. Cited. 169 C. 502; overruled with respect to holding an uninsured motorist coverage, see 219 C. 371; 170 C. 387; 172 C. 263; Id., 416; overruled with respect to holding an uninsured motorist coverage, see 219 C. 371; 179 C. 269; Id., 415; 183 C. 520; Id., 566; 186 C. 198; Id., 757; 191 C. 336; 192 C. 732; 194 C. 139; Id., 279; 196 C. 53; Id., 91; 201 C. 125; 202 C. 292; Id., 300; Id., 629; 211 C. 116; 213 C. 220; 224 C. 693; 226 C. 191; 228 C. 758; 242 C. 211. By its own terms, section does not apply to Department of Mental Retardation's decisions regarding eligibility for services. 277 C. 594.

Cited. 2 CA 196; 3 CA 1; Id., 240; 4 CA 168; 8 CA 581; 10 CA 18; 15 CA 323; 35 CA 464; 40 CA 359; 43 CA 801. Section not intended to limit legislative power or to affect statutory construction when intent is clear. 47 CA 68.

Cited. 20 CS 84. Statutory construction involves consideration of terms of act as a whole and circumstances and conditions existing at the time which may have affected its intent and motivated its adoption. Id., 428; 26 CS 329. What is meant by “statutory construction”. 21 CS 144. Cited. 22 CS 10, 155, 440; 24 CS 149; 29 CS 344, 397. Library of a law office held to be a “private library” within Sec. 12-81(32) as the word “private” must be accorded its common meaning taken from the dictionary. 31 CS 359. Cited. 35 CS 555; Id., 617; 36 CS 141; Id., 578; Id., 583; 38 CS 689; 39 CS 195; 43 CS 46; 44 CS 34.

When language is plain and unambiguous it need not be construed. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 181; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 368. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 367. Penal statute to be strictly construed. Id., 674. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 678.

Subsec. (a):

Usual and natural meaning of words ordinarily followed. 61 C. 12; 63 C. 388; 82 C. 232; 84 C. 306; 85 C. 484; 90 C. 367; 92 C. 254; 99 C. 118; 133 C. 290; 144 C. 516; 152 C. 312; 153 C. 209; 154 C. 162; Id., 237; 155 C. 531; Id., 573; 156 C. 33. “May” may be construed to mean “shall”; 65 C. 487; 74 C. 60; 94 C. 292; 103 C. 607; or “must”; 84 C. 650; and “shall” may permit discretion. 75 C. 509; 76 C. 405. “Passage of act” means when it goes into effect. 68 C. 426. Meaning of “personal representatives” depends on context. 71 C. 290. Letter may yield to intent; 72 C. 148; comma may be disregarded; 93 C. 515; 95 C. 723; or its omission; 97 C. 601; Id., 735; 107 C. 605; or be departed from to avoid injustice. 87 C. 446. The technical meaning of words will not be permitted to defeat intent. 74 C. 60; 77 C. 31; 83 C. 141; 93 C. 515; 100 C. 324. Penalty of “fine and imprisonment” permits either. 75 C. 350. Words having technical meaning at common law are given the same in a statute. 79 C. 546; Id., 562; 80 C. 658. “Brother” may include half-brother. 79 C. 562. Exceptions may be implied. 81 C. 320; Id., 632. General words do not include state. 82 C. 392. General words may be limited by subject matter. 89 C. 583. Effect of title. 89 C. 196; 91 C. 135; Id., 472. Where general words follow an enumeration, they apply only to persons or those of same general class as those enumerated. 126 C. 430, 431. Technical terms of trade or business have meaning they have to informed practitioners thereof. 144 C. 346; 153 C. 465. Practice of law construed. 154 C. 129. Cited. 158 C. 452. Words used in statute are to be given their commonly approved usage. Id., 461; their plain ordinary meaning. 159 C. 544. Definition of “farming” and “agriculture” includes nurseries. 160 C. 71. Cited re tax statutes. 164 C. 178. Cited. Id., 360. “Commence” defined. 165 C. 687. Webster's Third New International Dictionary cited to define “government”, “policy” and “direct”. Id., 757. Cited. 166 C. 337; Id., 405; 170 C. 567; 175 C. 49; Id., 349; 179 C. 277; 181 C. 1; Id., 114; 183 C. 183; 185 C. 118; 186 C. 623; 187 C. 363; Id., 386; 188 C. 542; 189 C. 321; 190 C. 143; 191 C. 636; 192 C. 571; 194 C. 129; Id., 165; 196 C. 53; 198 C. 185; 200 C. 713; 203 C. 45; 205 C. 386; 206 C. 337; 208 C. 267; Id., 709; 209 C. 429; 211 C. 339; 212 C. 100; Id., 661; 213 C. 66; Id., 354; 214 C. 209; Id., 321; 216 C. 40; Id., 402; 219 C. 314; Id., 520; 221 C. 751; 222 C. 361; 223 C. 573; 224 C. 44; 225 C. 297; Id., 566; 226 C. 191; 227 C. 505; 228 C. 158; Id., 795; 230 C. 24; 234 C. 301; Id., 401; Id., 783; 235 C. 778; Id., 850; 237 C. 490; 238 C. 784; 240 C. 317; Id., 590; 242 C. 17. Term “hearing” leaves room for flexibility as required for due process. 247 C. 732. “Access” defined; to ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to its dictionary definition. 250 C. 188. Common meaning rule applied to Workers' Compensation Act provisions. 285 C. 348.

Cited. 1 CA 22; 2 CA 49; 3 CA 16; Id., 230; Id., 343; 4 CA 111; Id., 200; Id., 307; 8 CA 528; Id., 607; Id., 673; 12 CA 138; Id., 196; 14 CA 322; 15 CA 205; 17 CA 344; 20 CA 302; 26 CA 490; 27 CA 800; 31 CA 47; 34 CA 352; 35 CA 173; Id., 714; 36 CA 98; 37 CA 72; Id., 619; Id., 764; 38 CA 360; Id., 815; 39 CA 441; 40 CA 705; judgment reversed, see 240 C. 590; 44 CA 162; 46 CA 661.

Cited. 31 CS 216; 36 CS 59; Id., 586; 37 CS 506; Id., 596; Id., 654; 38 CS 54; 39 CS 449; 40 CS 77; Id., 194; 45 CS 33.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 600; 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372.

Subsec. (b):

“Railroad” held to include street railway; 78 C. 295; to exclude it. 80 C. 40.

Subsec. (c):

“Banks” held to include industrial bank. 125 C. 319.

Subsec. (f):

Cited. 57 C. 57; 150 C. 241; 166 C. 325. Statute cannot be logically invoked for words importing plural to include the singular to make “employees” singular as it appears after the words “to insure a clear and identifiable community of interest among ...” in Sec. 7-471(3). Statute is directory but not mandatory. 175 C. 349. Cited. Id.; 187 C. 386; 214 C. 407; 218 C. 438; 223 C. 610; 239 C. 708.

Cited. 35 CS 587.

Subsec. (g):

Cited. 57 C. 57. “Widow” will not be construed to include widower. 91 C. 77. Cited. 212 C. 661; 226 C. 618.

Subsec. (h):

Cited. 211 C. 508; 220 C. 584.

Cited. 15 CA 205.

Subsec. (i):

Cited. 157 C. 126.

Cited. 29 CA 465; 40 CA 483; 42 CA 480. “Month” and “year” not construed to change intent of statutory rape legislation. 47 CA 68.

Subsec. (k):

Cited. 81 C. 149. Not construed to make state suable without its consent. 82 C. 392; 133 C. 64; 150 C. 308. Cited. 168 C. 26; 212 C. 661.

Applied to corporations. 18 CS 272.

Subsec. (m):

Cited. 175 C. 545; Id., 576; 200 C. 38.

Subsec. (q):

Regular, commercially-operated slaughtering of animals unrelated to the farm itself is not included within definition of farming. 188 C. 724. Cited. 199 C. 294; 239 C. 124.

Cited. 3 CA 53; 24 CA 163.

“Farm land” defined for tax purposes. 26 CS 160.

Subsec. (s):

Applies only to a valid repeal. 11 CS 489.

Subsec. (t):

Cited. 67 C. 289; 68 C. 515; 78 C. 425; 97 C. 14; 121 C. 199; 152 C. 85. When a saving provision exists, a crime committed prior to the effective date of the repealing act remains punishable under the terms of the prior statute. 169 C. 13. Cited. 171 C. 278. Repeal of act shall not affect any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at time of repeal for offense committed under repealed act. 172 C. 242. Cited. 237 C. 364.

There is no express language in P.A. 11-71 or any indication in the legislative history that the legislature clearly and unequivocally intended P.A. 11-71 to apply retroactively and thus the savings statutes apply and the law in effect at the time of defendant's offense for possession of marijuana and use of drug paraphernalia controls. 147 CA 232; judgment reversed in part on alternate grounds, see 315 C. 861.

Rule of construction. 3 CS 12. Applied. 16 CS 446.

Subsec. (u):

Cited. 59 C. 367; 67 C. 48; Id., 469; 70 C. 565. Intent to affect pending action, clearly shown, will be given effect; 75 C. 447; 86 C. 425; 127 C. 420; also, where an act concerning procedure is made general in its terms. 89 C. 46. Cited. 134 C. 342. Passage of an act does not affect pending action for divorce on ground of habitual intemperance. 136 C. 191. Cited. 137 C. 343; 142 C. 29, 329. Amendment to dram shop act limiting liability did not affect pending action. 149 C. 396. “Long-arm” statute is procedural and applies to action on rights matured before its passage. 157 C. 92. Court session date changes did not affect pending action. Id., 434. Cited. 174 C. 366. Statutes should be construed retroactively only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. 177 C. 93. Cited. 187 C. 451; 201 C. 16; 202 C. 541; 203 C. 34; Id., 455; Id., 484; 204 C. 17; 217 C. 612; 235 C. 850; 237 C. 364; 239 C. 676; 247 C. 638.

Cited. 6 CA 194; 9 CA 327.

Unless intent is plain that public act or general statute repeals a special act, latter will continue in effect. 26 CS 260. Cited. 34 CS 31; 38 CS 689; 44 CS 34; Id., 297.

Subsec. (w):

Cited. 166 C. 178; 185 C. 517; 196 C. 309; 240 C. 97.